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Engvall v. Soo Line Railroad Company8/2/2001
of the action of contribution is common liability." Horton by Horton v. Orbeth, Inc., 342 N.W.2d 112, 114 (Minn. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). "' t is joint liability, rather than joint or concurring negligence, which determines the right of contribution.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 148 n.2, 241 N.W.2d 641, 645 n.2 (1976)).
Soo Line argues that common liability exists because Engvall could have brought a state common law action of negligence per se based on a violation of the LIA against GM. In response, GM first argues that Engvall could not have brought a direct action against it because Urie establishes that there is no private right of action under the LIA and, although a railroad employee may use an LIA violation to establish negligence per se in a FELA action, manufacturers are not liable under the FELA. Although Soo Line concedes that manufacturers are not proper FELA defendants, it contends that GM misinterprets Urie. We agree. In Urie, the Supreme Court stated that the LIA and the SAA were amendments to the FELA. 337 U.S. at 189. In doing so, the Court noted that "by its own terms the , like the , does not purport to confer any right of action upon injured employees." Urie, 337 U.S. at 188 (footnote omitted). However, this merely means that the LIA and the SAA do not provide statutory causes of action, and that a party suing for violation of either act must do so under a common law action. See Crane v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry., 395 U.S. 164, 166 (1969) (noting that the SAA "did not create a federal cause of action for either employees or nonemployees seeking damages for injuries resulting from a railroad's violation of the Act" and that, although Congress subsequently provided employees with such a cause of action by enacting the FELA, "the non-employee must look for his remedy to a common law action in tort"); Fairport, Painesville & E. R.R. v. Meredith, 292 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1934) (automobile driver injured in collision with train at railroad crossing may recover in state common law action against railroad based on SAA violation); Steffey v. Soo Line R.R., 498 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Minn. App.) (intoxicated trespasser may assert state common law claim against railroad based on LIA violation), rev. denied (Minn. May 28, 1993).
Although the claims in Crane, Meredith, and Steffey were asserted against railroads rather than manufacturers, GM concedes that manufacturers are subject to the LIA. Nor is it significant that the claims in those cases were asserted by nonemployees, while Engvall was an employee. In Meredith, the Supreme Court stated:
The federal Safety Appliance Act, as we already have said and this court repeatedly has ruled, imposes absolute duties upon interstate railway carriers and thereby creates correlative rights in favor of such injured persons as come within its purview; but the right to enforce the liability which arises from the breach of duty is derived from the principles of the common law. 292 U.S. at 598 (emphasis added).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that the LIA, "like the Safety Appliance Act, is to be liberally construed in the light of its prime purpose, the protection of employees and others by requiring the use of safe equipment." Lilly v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 317 U.S. 481, 486 (1943) (emphasis added). Because the "prime purpose" of both the LIA and the SAA includes "the protection of employees," Lilly, 317 U.S. at 486, railroad employees such as Engvall clearly fall within the "purview" of those statutes and may "enforce the liability which arises from the breach of duty" under those statutes when permitted by the common law, Meredith, 292 U.S. at 598.
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