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Rathgeber v. James Hemenway8/15/2001
bly, to be case-specific. See, e.g., Meyer v. 4-D Insulation Co., Inc., 60 Or App 70, [73-]74, 652 P2d 852 (1982) (describing seemingly 'ad hoc' quality of judicial decisions in this area). Regardless, we conclude that plaintiff's complaint alleges an invasion sufficient to support recovery of such damages." Id. at 621-22.
On review, the Supreme Court took a different tack. The court analyzed the case as "a straightforward claim for medical malpractice," rather than as a question of whether an independent legally protected interest had been violated negligently, thus warranting recovery for emotional distress. Curtis, 327 Or at 13. The court concluded that the plaintiff had alleged "a specific duty to be aware of and guard against particular adverse psychological reactions or consequences to medical procedures." Id. at 14-15. The court emphasized that its holding was not meant to subject all medical professionals to a heightened standard of care:
"Our holding should not be read to mean that medical professionals operate under a general duty to avoid any emotional harm that foreseeably might result from their conduct. In that regard, their duty is no greater than that of the population at large. But, where the standard of care in a particular medical profession recognizes the possibility of adverse psychological reactions or consequences as a medical concern * * *, the law will not insulate persons in that profession from liability if they fail in those duties, thereby causing the contemplated harm." Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
It is not entirely clear to what extent the reasoning of Curtis applies to cases--such as this one--that cannot be regarded as "straightforward" medical malpractice claims. However, we need not decide whether Curtis applies broadly to claims such as plaintiffs' here. As noted, Curtis makes clear that a particular duty to prevent emotional distress does not inhere in every professional relationship, even those that directly involve the rendition of health care services. It follows that, if Curtis applies, in order to recover emotional distress damages for defendants' breaches of fiduciary duty, plaintiffs were required to prove that defendants owed them a particular duty to avoid the negligent infliction of emotional distress. That plaintiffs did not do. Plaintiffs proved that defendants breached fiduciary duties. However, plaintiffs offered no evidence showing that, in this context, defendants had a duty to recognize as a particular concern the risk of an adverse psychological reaction or consequence if the transaction were to go awry. Accordingly, plaintiffs cannot rely upon Curtis to support the recovery of emotional distress damages here.
The same conclusion is compelled under this court's prior decisions applying the "legally protected interest" exception. We consistently have rejected claims for emotional distress damages stemming from relationships that are fundamentally economic, either because they did not involve an invasion of legally protected interests or because the interests were not deemed to be sufficiently important. See Stevens v. First Interstate Bank, 167 Or App 280, 287, 999 P2d 551 (2000) (characterizing the relationship between depositors and their bank as "not of the sort that Oregon courts have found gives rise to the requisite distinct 'legally protected interest'" (emphasis added)); see also McCulloch v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 157 Or App 237, 252, 971 P2d 414 (1998), rev den 328 Or 365 (1999) ("The underlying interest arises from the relationship between plaintiff as a client and defendants as accountants. Even though the relationship is fiduciary in nature, it is fundamentally an economic one."); Collver v. Salem In
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