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Busta v. Columbus Hospital Corp.5/10/1996
are as plain, clear, concise, and as brief as possible. Instructions should never be proposed or given for the purpose of creating one more obstacle to a resolution of a case on its merits.
Based on the aforementioned analysis, and our reversal of the requirement in Kitchen Krafters that causation instructions include a discussion of foreseeability, we conclude that the District Court's failure to define proximate cause was at most harmless error and affirm the District Court's denial of the hospital's motion for a new trial based on instructional error.
Although the hospital makes occasional reference in its appellate brief and argument to independent intervening causes, there was no proof offered at the time of trial that any person contributed as a cause of Delbert's injury and death other than Delbert and the defendant hospital. Therefore, a proper instruction to the jury in this case on the subject of causation would have related solely to cause-in-fact as articulated by the substantial factor instruction. However, as we held in Davis v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (1990), 244 Mont. 61, 71, 796 P.2d 181, 186, we will not reverse a district court for failure to provide a necessary instruction to the jury unless the court's omission affected the substantial rights of the complaining party. In this case, there was no prejudice to the hospital by the District Court's failure to instruct the jury on cause-in-fact. First, cause-in-fact is a simple concept that most lay people are capable of understanding. Second, there was no disagreement with plaintiff's contention that the design of the hospital's windows contributed to Delbert's fall and injuries. The issue was simply whether the hospital was negligent by allowing its windows to remain in a condition which would permit a patient to either escape or fall through them. That issue was decided in Ida Busta's favor based on proper instructions to the jury and was supported by substantial and virtually uncontroverted evidence.
For these reasons, we conclude that the District Court did not err when it refused to give the defendant's proposed instructions which defined proximate cause and which stated the requirement that decedent's injuries be foreseeable before causation could be established; and that the District Court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the meaning of cause-in-fact was harmless error.
ISSUE 4
Did the District Court err when it refused to offset benefits received by Ida Busta from the Veterans' Administration against the damages awarded for the decedent's wrongful death?
Following trial, the hospital moved the court pursuant to ยง 27-1-308, MCA, to deduct from the plaintiff's judgment that amount Ida Busta received from the Veterans' Administration due to her husband's death. Section 27-1-308, MCA, provides in relevant part that:
(1) In an action arising from bodily injury or death when the total award against all defendants is in excess of $50,000 and the plaintiff will be fully compensated for his damages, exclusive of court costs and attorney fees, a plaintiff's recovery must be reduced by any amount paid or payable from a collateral source that does not have a subrogation right.
Section 27-1-307(1), MCA, defines "collateral source" as:
payment for something that is later included in a tort award and which is made to or for the benefit of a plaintiff or is otherwise available to the plaintiff:
(a) for medical expenses and disability payments under the federal Social Security Act, any federal, state, or local income disability act, or any other public program;
(e
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