 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Busta v. Columbus Hospital Corp.5/10/1996
laintiff's proposed instruction on causation was withdrawn.
The District Court rejected the hospital's proposed instructions numbered 20, 21, and 22 on the basis that they did not satisfy the format required by Kitchen Krafters, and therefore, no instruction which defined proximate cause was submitted to the jury.
After the District Court indicated which instructions it would give and which instructions were refused, it asked whether the defendant had any objections. No objection was stated at that time to the court's failure to provide any instruction to the jury which defined proximate cause.
The jury was instructed that both parties had the burden of proving that the other was negligent and that the other party's negligence was a proximate cause of Delbert's injuries. It was explained to the jury that a person is negligent if he or she fails to act as an ordinarily careful person would act under the circumstances. The jury was also instructed by the court that when it considered whether a hospital's premises were safe, it should consider the type of person who could reasonably be expected to be a patient there.
Pursuant to these instructions, the jury, by its verdict, found that both the hospital and Delbert were negligent and that each party's negligence contributed as a proximate cause to Delbert's injuries and death. It apportioned seventy percent of the total fault for his injuries to the hospital and thirty percent to Delbert.
Following entry of judgment for the plaintiff, the hospital moved for a new trial for several reasons, including the District Court's failure to define proximate cause in its instructions to the jury. That basis for the hospital's motion was rejected by the District Court. In explanation of its order, the District Court stated that the defendant had failed to offer a proximate cause instruction which adequately addressed the facts in this case and failed to object to the court's failure to define proximate cause until after the jury returned its verdict. The court added that to the extent it erred by not defining proximate cause for the jury, that error was harmless because the fact that this type of accident could happen from the failure to secure hospital windows was indisputably foreseeable and there was no evidence of intervening acts by third parties which would interrupt the chain of causation. Finally, the District Court noted that part of the confusion which resulted in its failure to define proximate cause was attributable to the difficulty that district courts have dealing with that issue since this Court's decision in Kitchen Krafters and respectfully requested that this Court better settle the requirements for instruction of juries on the subject of causation in future cases.
On appeal, the hospital contends that because the District Court referred to "proximate cause" in other instructions, it was necessary that the term be explained to the jury. The hospital further contends that because this Court included foreseeability as an element of proximate cause in Kitchen Krafters and because the foreseeability of Delbert's conduct on December 1, 1991, was a specific issue, it was important that the jury be specifically instructed regarding foreseeability.
In response, the plaintiff contends that the defendant waived its objection to the District Court's failure to instruct on the issue of proximate cause by its failure to bring the court's omission to its attention before the jury's verdict was returned. The plaintiff further contends that even if the District Court erred, the error was harmless because causation was established by the undisputed evidence, and therefore, a
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Montana Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|