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Fawcett v. Adreon8/21/2001
eing pursuit by law enforcement personnel. The fact that law enforcement personnel pursue an actual or suspected violator of a law or ordinance who flees from such pursuit shall not render the law enforcement personnel, or the employers of such personnel, liable for injuries to a third party proximately caused by the fleeing party unless the conduct of the law enforcement personnel was negligent and such negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries to the third party. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-8-108(d) and (e) (1998).
Thus, under section 55- 8-108(e), a municipality cannot be held liable for an injury to "an actual or suspected violator of a law or ordinance who is fleeing pursuit by law enforcement personnel." Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-108(e). However, a municipality can be held liable for injuries to a third party occurring during a police chase if "the conduct of the law enforcement personnel was negligent and such negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries to the third party." Id.
In support of his argument, Mr. Fawcett cites Haynes v. Hamilton County, 883 S.W.2d 606 (Tenn. 1994). In Haynes, police engaged in a high speed chase of a traffic violator. The police officer chasing the violator slowed down in heavy traffic, but the violator did not. The traffic violator's car crossed the center line and collided with a vehicle, killing the three teenage occupants. Id. at 608. The Court in Haynes held, inter alia, that the term "conduct" as used in Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-8-108(e) would encompass the police officer's decision to commence or continue a high speed chase, as well as the officer's operation of his law enforcement vehicle. Id. at 610-11. The Haynes Court stated:
Accordingly, we conclude that an officer's decision to commence or continue a high-speed chase is encompassed within the statutory term "conduct" and may form the basis of liability in an action brought by a third party who is injured by the fleeing suspect, if the officer's decision was unreasonable. In determining whether the decision to initiate or continue pursuit is reasonable, the risk of injury to innocent third parties should be weighed against the interest in apprehending suspects. Id. at 611.
In discussing the analysis under the statute, as in the quotes above, the Haynes Court on occasion uses the term "innocent third party." Id. at 611, 612, and 613. However, the statute refers simply to a "third party," and we must conclude that the use of the adjective "innocent" in Haynes is descriptive and not intended as a requirement.
Since the injured parties in Haynes were the occupants of a vehicle not involved in the high speed pursuit, Haynes does not address the central issue in this case, namely, whether the passenger in a vehicle involved in a high speed police chase is a "third party" under Section 55-8-108(e). The parties have not cited to this Court a reported decision which directly addresses this issue, nor has our research located such a case. The language of the statute does not indicate whether a passenger in a fleeing vehicle would be considered a "suspected violator" or a "third party."
The Haynes Court noted that "police officers have a duty to apprehend law violators and . . . the decision to commence or continue pursuit of a fleeing suspect is, by necessity, made rapidly." Haynes, 883 S.W.2d at 611. The split-second decision of whether to chase a fleeing vehicle must at times be made with little or no information about the driver or the passenger. Under the analysis urged by Mr. Fawcett, law enforcement personnel would be constrained against chasing any fleeing vehicle with a passenger, unless the law enforcement officer had affirmative informa
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