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Wal-Mart Stores8/16/2001 . § 304.104 (Vernon 1998). The prejudgement interest statute does not set forth requirements for what constitutes adequate written notice of a claim. Robinson v. Brice, 894 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, writ denied).
The statute, however, plainly requires not merely written notice of an accident and resulting injuries, but also written notice of a claim. Id. The statute does not define the term "claim." The word "claim" ordinarily means a demand for compensation or an assertion of a right to be paid. Id. The statute does not require the claimant to demand an exact amount or list every element of damage claimed. Id. at 529. We will examine the documents Wal-Mart and Candace reference in support of their respective arguments under this standard.
Wal-Mart argues it did not receive written notice of a claim for compensation from Candace until February 22, 1994, the date it received letter from Candace dated, February 12, 1994. Candace contends, however, Wal-Mart had notice of her claim on October 26, 1993. On October 26, 1993, a note was given to Candace that provided the name of Wal- Mart's claim specialist, Walt Ney, his telephone number, and a ten digit alpha-numeric number that may be a claim number for Candace's incident. The bottom of the note bears the handwritten notation, "Given to us at pharmacy by WM employee after filling prescription 10/26/93." On October 29, Ney sent Candace an authorization for medical records and reports. Finally, on February 22, 1994, Ney received a handwritten letter from Candace requesting payment for medical expenses, lost wages, and other monetary losses as a result of the incident. The letter states, in part:
"Enclosed are copies of payments made concerning this case. ... Please remit payment of $467.69 in full. ... Due to my injury at [Wal- Mart]...horses and I have been virtually idle since 10/26/93. In the immediate future, I will be forced to send six horses to other trainers.... The cost per horse will be $400.00 to $500.00 per month for training. ... The expenditures for the paying of another trainer to do my routine activities will be invoiced to Wal-Mart through your office."
Candace's letter was sufficient to notify Wal-Mart that she was claiming compensation for her injuries and afforded it the opportunity to settle the claim without incurring liability for prejudgment interest. Therefore, Candace is entitled to prejudgment interest calculated beginning on the 180th day after February 22, 1994, the date Wal-Mart received Candace's letter dated February 12, and ending on the day preceding the date judgment was rendered. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 304.104.
We sustain Wal-Mart's third appellate issue. The judgment will be modified to reflect the correct commencement date for prejudgment interest of February 22, 1994, and as modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Judgment rendered and Opinion filed August 16, 2001.
Do Not Publish -- TEX. R. APP. P. 47.3(b).
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