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Dobrinski v. State8/9/2001
ntly he was awakened by a "thump." Appellant noticed damage to the right quarter of his windshield. Also, his right side view mirror was gone. While fully aware that an accident had occurred, appellant testified that he intentionally and knowingly failed to stop because he thought he had struck a construction barrier. Chaudry Riaz, an eyewitness to the accident, testified that the deceased's body was thrown into the middle of the right lane of the highway as a result of the accident and that appellant responded by accelerating his vehicle. Finally, appellant testified that the area where the accident occurred was well lighted and the skies were clear but that he saw nothing when he looked in his rear-view mirror.
Based on this testimony, we find that the State's evidence was legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction because any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of failing to stop and render aid beyond a reasonable doubt. Likewise, the State's evidence was not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Therefore, the evidence was also factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's third and fourth issues for review.
Issues One and Two
In issues one and two, appellant argues that the State's evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction because there was no aid he could have reasonably rendered complainant which was not being provided by others. More precisely, appellant contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding in Bowden v. State provides a defense to prosecution for failure to stop and render aid when other individuals are present to give aid. See 361 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962).
In Bowden, the Court found that the State's evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for failure to render aid following an automobile accident when others were already present and providing aid to the injured party. Id. at 208. Nevertheless, the facts of Bowden are easily distinguishable. The collision in Bowden occurred at the home of the injured party and the defendant was aware that the victim's husband was taking her to the hospital. Id. at 208. In fact, the injured party's husband had instructed the defendant to remain at the scene until police officers arrived. Id. The Bowden Court also noted that the defendant's car was disabled and the nearest telephone available was two miles from the scene. Id.
In the case at bar, appellant left the scene without determining whether the deceased was going to receive medical assistance. Appellant contends he had no knowledge that the impact caused injury or death. Also, he contends people were on the scene to give aid if necessary. However, this court recently concluded that a motorist involved in a collision is not relieved of the statutory duty to stop and render reasonable assistance despite the presence of others at the scene of the accident. See Allen, 971 S.W.2d at 718.
Accordingly, the holding in Bowden, if it can be properly termed a defense, is not applicable to this case. Having previously found that the State's evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction, we overrule appellant's first two issues and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment rendered and Opinion filed August 9, 2001.
Do Not Publish -- TEX. R. APP. P. 47.3(b).
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