 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Degel v. Buty8/27/2001
R>
A fact is deemed material for purposes of informed consent 'if a reasonably prudent person in the position of the patient or his representative would attach significance to it deciding whether or not to submit to the proposed treatment.' RCW 7.70.050(1).
Viewing the material evidence in the light most favorable to Dr. Buty, there is substantial evidence from which a jury could find that Dr. Buty explained the AROM procedure to Perisho prior to the day the baby was born as a method of inducing labor and again immediately before and during the procedure, as was his habit to do. A jury could also find that a reasonably prudent person in Perisho's position would have attached no significance to Dr. Buty's failure to discuss with Perisho the risks of cord prolapse associated with performing the AROM at high station for the purpose of attaching a scalp electrode based on expert testimony that such a risk was extraordinarily small. In addition, the jury could have found that there were no reasonable alternatives to monitoring the fetus internally and that a fully informed reasonably prudent patient under similar circumstances would not have refused the AROM procedure. It cannot be said, therefore, that there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inference to sustain a verdict for Dr. Buty on the informed consent claim. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Perisho's motions for a directed verdict or a new trial on the informed consent issue.
Conclusion
Because the standard for recovering damages in a lawsuit against a doctor has no bearing on the patient's freedom to choose medical procedures, we conclude that Perisho failed to establish that the objective standard regarding causation in the informed consent statute, RCW 7.70.050, is unconstitutional. In addition, the jury instruction defining informed consent was sufficient because it allowed the parties to argue their theories of the case, did not mislead the jury, and properly informed the jury of the law to be applied. And because the record does not support Perisho's contention that Dr. Buty admitted that he did not comply with his habit on this occasion, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Dr. Buty's habit. We also conclude that the trial court properly denied Perisho's motions for a directed verdict on the informed consent issue and a new trial because it cannot be said that there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inference to sustain a verdict for Dr. Buty on the informed consent claim. We also affirm the trial court's order vacating its partial summary judgment order on the medical negligence claim.
Affirmed.
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Washington Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|