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Gibbons v. Boeing Co.7/30/2001
In determining whether the proximate cause provision of the regulation applies to Gibbons' situation, the appeals judge correctly looked to the underlying purpose of the Act. We read each provision of a statute in relation to the other provisions and construe a statute as a whole.
As discussed above, the ultimate goal of time-loss compensation is to provide temporary financial support until the injured worker is able to return to work. 'This goal cannot come to fruition when a worker voluntarily removes himself from the active labor force and opts, despite the presence of sufficient physical capacities, to decline further employment activity.' A partially disabled worker who has already removed him or herself from the workforce has no expectation of receiving wages. Payment of time-loss compensation to a worker who has left the workplace while still capable of working is incongruous with the underlying principles of the Act. This is particularly true where a worker retires, and is thereafter found permanently partially disabled.
Such is the case here. Gibbons retired before the Board made a final determination of his status. The Board subsequently determined he was only partially disabled. Gibbons did not appeal. An unappealed Department order involving industrial insurance coverage is res judicata as to the issues encompassed in that order. The Department order of April 25, 1994 thus determined that as of July 3, 1993, Gibbons was capable of reasonably continuous gainful employment. Because Gibbons did not appeal, the April 25, 1994 closing order became final and binding. Accordingly, the order is res judicata that Gibbons was capable of continuous gainful employment when he retired. This order continues in effect, and renders Gibbons ineligible for time-loss compensation, then or now.
Gibbons argues that Williams v. Virginia Mason, has superceded Farr by declaring that WAC 296-14-100 is the guiding law. Williams, however, concerned only the propriety of a jury instruction defining voluntary retirement, and is not inconsistent with Farr. Williams did not address the issue at the heart of this appeal: whether a claimant who has voluntarily retired prior to a first determination of permanent partial disability can later assert his retirement was not voluntary. We hold he cannot.
Affirmed.
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