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Wyoming Board of Outfitters and Professional Guides v. Clark8/27/2001
in the same day-use area (we note at this juncture that no evidence was ever presented that they did, in fact, actually operate in the same day-use area or that the two outfitters ever operated even in close proximity to one another, only that such was a possibility). Included in the exhibits is a map of the Bridger-Teton National Forest that was used to demonstrate the boundaries of the various outfitters' areas of operation. The map is of some marginal utility, but the evidentiary markings on it can best be described as resembling the borders and battle lines of an all-out Balkan's war. We are persuaded that, based upon Nyman's objection to Clark working for Dale Clark, such objection would apply to all outfitters operating in the Bridger-Teton National Forest (in theory, though perhaps not in actual application). Nonetheless, the Board approved Clark's request to serve as a guide for Dale Clark. We will return to this subject later in the opinion; however, we make mention of Nyman's letter here because it caused the Board to initiate an investigation which resulted in disciplinary action being taken against Clark.
[ ] As noted above, the Board denied Clark a license when he applied for a 1999 season license. Although it does not form a basis for our affirmance of this case, it is necessary as a threshold matter to briefly discuss the hearing officer's determination that the burden of proof in the hearing before the Board was on Clark. The hearing officer made reference to JM v. Department of Family Services, 922 P.2d 219, 221-22 (Wyo. 1996) to justify that ruling. Our decision in JM is not directly applicable to the circumstances of this case. In quoted material, we did include the statement, "an applicant for benefits or for a license is the proponent in eligibility determinations," but to the extent the quoted phrase is applicable, Clark had already met his burden of proof. 922 P.2d at 221 (quoting 4 Jacob A. Stein, et al., Administrative Law § 24.02 at 24-21 (1987)). Based on the circumstances of this case, the provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-414 (LexisNexis 2001), and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-113 (LexisNexis 2001), once Clark established the qualifications for licensure, the burden of proof should have shifted to the Board to go forward with its evidence justifying the denial of Clark's license, though Clark had the burden of persuading the Board that its grounds for denial were insufficient under the governing statutes and regulations. See JM, 922 P.2d at 221-22; also see Casper Iron & Metal v. Unemployment Insurance Commission, 845 P.2d 387, 393-94 (Wyo. 1993).
[ ] The dispositive issue in this case is whether there is substantial evidence to support the Board's findings and, hence, its conclusion that Clark's license could be denied. We defer to an agency's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind can accept as adequate to support an agency's conclusion. Colorado Interstate Gas Company v. Wyoming Department of Revenue, 2001 WY 34 , 20 P.3d 528, .
[ ] The Board found that Clark made a material misrepresentation to the Board when he appeared before it on August 24, 1998. The material misrepresentation was "implying" that he had spoken directly with Gregg Fischer about service as a guide for Fischer when, in fact, he had not spoken directly to Fischer. No verbatim record of exactly what Clark said at that meeting is available, only the minutes of the meeting. The minutes make no mention of Clark's request to guide for Fischer. It is only through exhibits in the record that any information with respect to the request to guide for Fischer can be found. One is a notation that the req
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