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Colby v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.6/15/1995
e No-Fault Act, the General Assembly stated:
The original intention of the Colorado general assembly in enacting the 'Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act' . . . was to limit required rehabilitation benefits in both time and amount. . . . Such intention is evidenced by the report of the special interim committee on automobile insurance created by the legislative council in 1972.
While this declaration of intent was made some 21 years after the adoption of the original statute, it is instructive. See People v. Holland, 708 P.2d 119 (Colo. 1985); Catholic Media Groups, Inc. v. Meyer, 879 P.2d 480 (Colo. App. 1994).
Further, in 1994, the General Assembly repealed the former provision quoted above in its entirety, and amended the statute to provide that minimum coverage now extends to:
Compensation without regard to fault up to a limit of fifty thousand dollars per person for any one accident within ten years after such accident for payment of the cost of rehabilitation procedures or treatment and rehabilitative occupational training necessary because of bodily injury arising out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle. Section 10-4-706(1)(c)(I), C.R.S. (1994 Repl. Vol. 4A).
As a result, we conclude that, in the context of this case, defendant's policy satisfied the rehabilitation benefits requirement in § 10-4-706(1)(c)(II) because it obligated defendant to pay up to $50,000 and that amount has been paid. In our view, the presumption in § 10-4-706(1)(c)(II) applies to years only so that an insurer may be required to pay additional benefits if less than $50,000 has been paid within five years.
We further conclude that § 10-4-710 does not apply in resolving the issue before us because that section addresses additional coverage which must be offered in exchange for additional premiums. See Brown v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 809 P.2d 1055 (Colo. App. 1990)( § 10-4-710 was not intended to affect the amounts payable under § 10-4-706(1)(b) to (1)(e)).
On this basis, we conclude that the two statutes are reconcilable and consistent with the overall legislative scheme.
Finally, and contrary to plaintiff's contention, we do not view the result that we reach here as inconsistent with the general purpose of the No-Fault Act to avoid payment of inadequate compensation to victims of automobile accidents. Section 10-4-702, C.R.S. (1994 Repl. Vol. 4A); see Cingoranelli v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., supra.
That goal must be considered in the context of all victims and the objective of providing compensation without regard to fault in the underlying accident. See Colorado Legislative Council, Research Publ. #190, supra, at 6. Conversely, the construction of the statute urged by plaintiff would afford the same coverage under the minimum requirements for rehabilitation benefits imposed by § 10-4-706(1)(c)(II) as that authorized for additional premiums under § 10-4-710.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint.
JUDGE ROTHENBERG and JUDGE ROY concur.
Disposition
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
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