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C.P. v. Allstate Insurance Company3/3/2000
nce claims against Brown. Further, the court held that the allegations against her constituted an "accident" under the policy's terms, even if her ex-husband's acts were intentional.
The Eighth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Steele. In that case, a sixteen-year-old boy raped his twelve-year-old stepsister while she was visiting her father and stepmother. The victim's mother asserted a negligent supervision claim against the father and stepmother. The court, applying Minnesota law, reasoned that under the insurance policy's exclusions and joint obligations clause, one insured's intentional act barred coverage for claims against other insureds for negligent supervision. Further, the court found that the stepbrother's intentional and criminal sexual conduct was not an "accident" within coverage provisions of the policy.
Allstate argues that Worthington is unpersuasive, and, moreover, is now contrary to Utah law. We nonetheless find its reasoning more persuasive and more consistent with the principles that govern insurance coverage disputes in Alaska.
Reading the liability coverage language in isolation, we consequently reject Allstate's "accident" argument and hold that C.P.'s claims against the elder Lancasters were within the liability coverage part.
2. The exclusions and the joint obligations clause
The coverage language was potentially subject to other relevant policy provisions: the criminal and intentional act exclusions and the joint obligations clause. The intentional act exclusion excluded coverage for bodily injury "resulting from . . . an act or omission intended or expected to cause bodily injury." The criminal act exclusion excluded coverage for bodily injury "resulting from . . . a criminal act or omission." The joint obligations clause is found in the policy's "insuring agreement." The joint obligations clause provides: "The terms of this policy impose joint obligations on persons defined as an insured person. This means that the responsibilities, acts and failures to act of a person defined as an insured person will be binding upon another person defined as an insured person."
Allstate argues that both exclusions apply because C.P.'s injuries resulted from Harold's intentional and criminal acts. Further, it argues that the joint obligations clause attributes the conduct of one insured person -- Harold -- to the other insured persons -- the elder Lancasters, thus confirming that the exclusions apply to the claims against Dolan and Eleanor. It consequently does not matter to Allstate that only Harold's conduct was intentional or criminal and that the elder Lancasters' unintentional and non-criminal acts may also have been a causal factor in C.P.'s injuries.
C.P. does not deny that she was injured as a result of Harold's intentional or criminal acts. But she contends that the Lancasters' negligence also caused her injuries, and that their negligence should be treated independently for purposes of determining coverage. Her claims against the elder Lancasters allege their direct liability and are based on her theory that they negligently breached duties they owed to her. Her claims do not attempt to make the elder Lancasters vicariously liable for Harold's intentional and criminal actions. According to her, the relevant question is "what coverage does the policy provide, or possibly provide, for losses resulting from a combination of both covered and excluded causes?" She asserts that the policy does not unambiguously exclude her claims because the exclusions do not explicitly exclude coverage for a claim "which results partly or entirely from an excluded cause, regardless
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