 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Lawrence v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau3/23/2000
at the Bureau improperly analyzed the worker's justification for refusal of the job offer. I, therefore, dissent.
I.
[ ] Although I would harmonize N.D.C.C. §§ 28-32-12.1 and 65-01-16, the Bureau's interpretation of N.D.C.C. § 65-01-16(8) is not unreasonable. Indeed, the Bureau's interpretation is consistent with the clear legislative history, see Hearing on H.B. 1270 Before the House Industry, Business, and Labor Comm., 55th N.D. Legis. 1Sess. (Feb. 3, 1997), and consistent with this Court's own interpretation of the statute in Scott v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 1998 ND 221, 13-17, 587 N.W.2d 153 (emphasis added):
[ ] The Bureau nevertheless asserts the ex parte communications in this case were not improper, citing N.D.C.C. § 65-01-16(8):
Rehearings must be conducted as hearings under chapter 28-32 to the extent the provisions of that chapter do not conflict with this section. The bureau may arrange for the designation of hearing officers to conduct rehearings and issue recommended findings, conclusions, and orders. In reviewing recommended findings, conclusions, and orders, the bureau may consult with its legal counsel representing it in the proceeding. This provision was enacted by the 1997 Legislative Assembly, and applies only to claims filed after July 31, 1997. See 1997 N.D. Sess. Laws Ch. 532, §§ 1, 7. It clearly does not apply in this case.
[ ] The Bureau asserts we may nevertheless look to the legislative history of N.D.C.C. § 65-01-16(8) to determine it was intended to clarify existing law, and demonstrates the legislature's intent to allow the ex parte contacts which occurred in this case. We disagree.
[ ] It is presumed the legislature acts with a purpose and does not perform useless acts. State v. Beilke, 489 N.W.2d 589, 592 (N.D. 1992); State Bank of Towner v. Edwards, 484 N.W.2d 281, 282 (N.D. 1992). Thus, it is presumed a legislative enactment is intended to change existing law. Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 161 (N.D. 1995); Beilke, 489 N.W.2d at 592; State Bank, 484 N.W.2d at 282. However, when the clear purpose of an amendment to a statute is to merely clarify existing law, the policy expressed in the amendment may be considered when construing rights under the original statute. Effertz v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 525 N.W.2d 691, 693 (N.D. 1994).
[ ] The principle allowing consideration of a subsequent clarifying amendment does not apply under the facts in this case. The 1997 Legislature did not amend an existing statute with the express intent of clarifying that statute. Here, the legislature enacted a new statute in a different title of the Century Code. The existing statute remains in its original form. Under these circumstances, the 1997 enactment is not a "clarifying amendment," but is a new enactment which attempts to carve out an exception to the general rule of N.D.C.C. § 28-32-12.1(3).
[ ] Prior to the 1997 amendment, the Bureau was clearly governed by the general rule of N.D.C.C. § 28-32-12.1(3), which prohibited the ex parte contacts in this case. The 1997 Legislature created a new provision in the Workers Compensation title of the Code, intended to allow the Bureau to consult with its attorneys when reviewing an ALJ's recommended decision. However, all other agencies remain subject to the proscriptions in N.D.C.C. § 28-32-12.1, which remains in effect. Under these circumstances, the 1997 enactment is not a clarifying amendment, but represents a clear intended change in the law. Accordingly, we do not consider the 1997 enactment or its legislative history when construing the Bureau's obligations under N.D.C.C. § 28-32- 12.1 prior to the effective date of
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 North Dakota Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|