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Bartlett v. Mirabal3/3/2000
This interlocutory appeal arises from a will contest. Petitioner Gia May Bartlett filed the will of Silvestre Mirabal (Decedent) for formal probate. Decedent's sister, Respondent Maria R. Mirabal (Contestant), challenged the will on various grounds. Petitioner moved for summary judgment. At the hearing on the motion, Contestant abandoned all grounds for contesting the will except her claim of undue influence. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the evidentiary standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence should have been applied by the trial court in determining whether genuine issues of material fact existed on the issue of undue influence. The basis for Petitioner's argument is that, because Contestant was ultimately required to prove undue influence by clear and convincing evidence at trial, the determination of whether there were disputed material facts in the summary judgment proceeding should have been governed by the same substantive evidentiary standards that applied to the case on the merits. We disagree and affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In response to Petitioner's motion for summary judgment, Contestant presented evidence intended to show that Petitioner had a confidential relationship with Decedent and that suspicious circumstances surrounded the execution of his last two wills. Both of these wills gave his entire estate to Petitioner. According to Contestant, the suspicious circumstances included (1) the unnatural and unjust distribution of the estate, (2) lack of consideration for the transfer or undue profit by Petitioner, (3) Petitioner's participation in the procurement of the will, (4) Decedent's age and frail health, (5) Decedent's susceptibility to undue influence, (6) Petitioner's isolation of Decedent from his family, and (7) abuse of a confidential relationship.
In granting the interlocutory appeal and denying summary judgment, the trial court's order specifically provided:
If the burden of proof at summary judgment proceedings were in fact "clear and convincing evidence", as held by the United States Supreme Court in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed2d 202 (1986), and further suggested by Justice Ransom in Eoff v. Forrest, 109 N.M. 695, 789 P.2d 1262 (1990), the Court would have granted [Petitioner's] Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the case.
Implicit in the order's language is that, for purposes of deciding the existence of genuine issues of material fact at the summary judgment stage, the trial court used the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, even though the burden of proof on the issue of undue influence at trial would have been under a clear-and-convincing standard.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
An appeal from the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment presents a question of law. We therefore review de novo the trial court's denial of summary judgment. See Harrell v. Hayes, 1998-NMCA-122, 11, 125 N.M. 814, 965 P.2d 933.
B. The Evidentiary Standard in Summary Judgment Proceedings
1. Petitioner's Contentions Generally
Petitioner essentially argues that New Mexico has already adopted the United States Supreme Court's rationale in Anderson. Anderson, of course, applied only to the federal standard for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. It is exclusively the province of the state judiciary in New Mexico to decide the standard for our state rules on summary judgment. See Rule 11-056 NMRA 2000. It is the state's prerogative to follow or not to follow Anderson. If Petitioner is correct that
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