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Steinberg v. South Dakota Department of Military and Veterans Affairs3/15/2000
nt as a matter of law.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[ ] In this case we are presented with the statutory interpretation of the 1995 amendments to SDCL 62-1-1(7). It is well settled that " tatutory interpretation presents a question of law reviewable de novo." Zoss v. Schaefers, 1999 SD 105, , 598 NW2d 550, 552 (citing Satellite Cable Srvs. v. Northern Electric, 1998 SD 67, , 581 NW2d 478, 480). When reviewing the construction of a statute, "we interpret statutes in accord with legislative intent." Welsh v. Centerville Township, 1999 SD 73, , 595 NW2d 622, 624 (quoting McIntyre v. Wick, 1996 SD 147, , 558 NW2d 347, 362 (citing Fall River County v. South Dakota Dept. of Revenue, 1996 SD 106, , 552 NW2d 620, 624)).
ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[ ] 1. Whether SDCL 62-1-1(7) requires a workers' compensation claimant to prove, by a standard of "major contributing cause," that an injury arose out of employment.
[ ] Steinberg argues the circuit court erroneously interpreted the definition of "injury" contained in SDCL 62-1-1(7) as amended in 1995. The circuit court construed SDCL 62-1-1(7)(a) in such a way that the term "major contributing cause" modifies the phrase "injury arising out of" the employment. The circuit court stated in its oral bench ruling, incorporated by reference in the circuit court's conclusions of law "it's my judgment that the major contributing cause language was intended by the Legislature to substantially increase the causal connection that is required to be proven under the 'arising out of' test imposed by the statute." The circuit court also found the "major contributing cause" language poses an even stricter standard than the tort-based concept of proximate cause in proving the employment caused the employee's injury . Steinberg argues the circuit court erred in its interpretation in that SDCL 62-1-1(7)(a) only applies to the degree of medical proof required to show the employment-related injury produced a "condition." Steinberg claims the circuit court treated the word "condition" as synonymous with the word "injury." We find the circuit court erred in its interpretation of this statute and we do not agree that the "major contributing cause" language in the statute was meant to raise a claimant's standard of proof of a work-related injury similar to or above the fault-based tort concept of proximate cause.
[ ] In addressing this issue, we strive to delineate the scope of legislative intent in amending SDCL 62-1-1(7). Prior to its amendment in 1995, SDCL 62-1-1(7) provided the definition for "injury" or "personal injury " as "only injury arising out of and in the course of the employment, and shall not include a disease in any form except as it shall result from the injury." Brady Memorial Home v. Hantke, 1999 SD 77, , 597 NW2d 677, 680 n7. In 1995, the legislature twice amended the workers' compensation law to add the relevant language of "major contributing cause." The result of those amendments is codified in SDCL 62-1-1(7)(a), (b) and (c). SDCL 62-1-1(7) provides:
(7) "Injury" or "personal injury ," only injury arising out of and in the course of the employment, and does not include a disease in any form except as it results from the injury. An injury is compensable only if it is established by medical evidence, subject to the following conditions:
(a) No injury is compensable unless the employment or employment related activities are a major contributing cause of the condition complained of; or
(b) If the injury combines with a pre-existing disease or condition to cause or prolong disability, impairment, or need for treatment, the condition complained of is compensable if the employment
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