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Steinberg v. South Dakota Department of Military and Veterans Affairs3/15/2000
or employment related injury is and remains a major contributing cause of the disability, impairment, or need for treatment; and
(c) If the injury combines with a pre-existing work related compensable injury, disability, or impairment, the subsequent injury is compensable if the subsequent employment or subsequent employment related activities contributed independently to the disability, impairment, or need for treatment. (emphasis added).
DMVA contends the amendments were intended to narrow the scope of compensable injuries, and require a significant causal link between an employee's actual work function and the injury , i.e., the "employment" or "employment related activities" must be a "major contributing cause" of the injury.
[ ] We do not agree with DMVA. First, inherent in DMVA's argument is that the employment or employment-related activities must be a major contributing cause of the employee's "injury;" here, Steinberg's fall. However, the legislature did not use the word "injury" in this specific provision of the 1995 amendments to subsection (a); instead, it used the words "condition complained of." We interpret that phrase to mean the resulting condition; i.e., the medical condition that resulted from the employment incident. Subsection (a) begins " o injury is compensable . . ." Surely if the legislature had wanted to insert the word "injury" after "major contributing cause," it would have done so. Instead, it chose to use the words "condition complained of." We do not assume the legislature intended to use "condition" synonymous with the word "injury" in the same sentence. In arriving at the intention of the legislature it is presumed that the words of the statute have been used to convey their ordinary, popular meaning." National Farmers v. Universal, 534 NW2d 63, 65 (SD 1995) (citing Oahe Conservancy Subdistrict v. Janklow, 308 NW2d 559, 561 (SD 1981)). Indeed, ""injury" is the . . . act or omission which caused the loss." Rosnick v. Marks, 357 NW2d 186, 190 (Neb 1984). "Condition," in contrast, is the loss produced by some injury; i.e., it is the result rather than the cause. The word "condition" means 'state of being.' Doyle v. Superior Court, 58 CalRptr2d 476, 481 (CalApp 1996). See also Reis v. Cox, 660 P2d 46, 50 (Id 1982) (noting "condition or matter complained of" was found to be plaintiff's status as having a foreign object left in her after surgery).
[ ] The new definition of "injury" in SDCL 62-1-1(7) retains the phrase "only injury arising out of and in the course of employment." By leaving this phrase intact, the legislature intended it to retain the standard for proving when an employment related injury occurred. The addition of the entirely new section " n injury is compensable only if it is established by medical evidence, subject to the following conditions . . .," applies only to the quantum of proof necessary to prove the resulting condition complained of from the employment related incident.
[ ] We do not believe the legislature intended to include two standards of causation -- something in excess of proximate cause and "arising out of"--that would directly contradict each other. "It is presumed that the legislature intended provisions of an act to be consistent and harmonious." Matter of Northwestern Public Service Co., 1997 SD 35, , 560 NW2d 925, 927 (citing State v. Chaney, 261 NW2d 674 (SD 1978)). "It is also presumed that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result." Id. (citing Applications of Black Hills Power and Light Co., 298 NW2d 799 (SD 1980)). The legislature certainly could have removed the phrase "arising out of" and instead defined injury in SDCL 62-1-1(7) with one sentence "only injury o
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