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Steinberg v. South Dakota Department of Military and Veterans Affairs3/15/2000
lated injury similar to, or even exceeding, the tort requirements of proximate cause. Professor Larson has commented in great detail concerning why proximate cause has no place in workers' compensation law. " roximate cause or legal cause is out of place in compensation law because, as developed in tort law, it is a concept that is itself thoroughly suffused with the idea of fault; that is, it is a theory of causation designed to bring about a just result when starting from an act containing some element of fault." 1 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law ยง 3.06, at 3-8. Professor Larson has also stated:
It is instantly apparent that "arising out of the employment" does not mean exactly the same thing as "legally caused by the employment." It is true, as many courts and writers have said, that "arising" has something to do with causal connection; but there are many shades and degree of causal connection, of which "legal" or "proximate" cause is only one. Id. at 3-7.
"Active physical causation by the surroundings is not required in order to satisfy what is implied by the expression 'arising out of the employment.'" Id. at 3-7 to 3-8 n 5.
[ ] Our case law has stated a claimant must establish a causal connection between the injury and the employment. Brady, 1999 SD 77, , 597 NW2d at 680 (citing Maroney v. Amay, 1997 SD 73, , 565 NW2d 70, 73 (citing Caldwell, 489 NW2d at 357). In Brady, we addressed the compensability of a herniated disc that could have been due either to a personal predisposing condition, work-related factors, or a combination of both. We observed: "Hantke must establish the "causal connection between injury and employment."" Brady, 1999 SD 77, , 597 NW2d at 680 (citing Maroney, 1997 SD 73, , 565 NW2d at 73 (citing Caldwell, 489 NW2d at 357)). This Court then stated " n addition, South Dakota law requires her to establish by medical evidence that the 'employment or employment conditions are a major contributing cause of the condition complained of[.]'" Id. (citing SDCL 62-1-1(7)). (emphasis added).
[ ] We have also stated "employment need not be the direct or proximate cause of injury . . ." Walz v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 1996 SD 135, , 556 NW2d 68, 73. In Anderson v. Hotel Cataract, 70 SD 376, 17 NW2d 913, 916 (1945), we stated: " t is apparent that the new standard, 'arising out of and in the course of employment' does not require that the latter be the proximate cause of injury. If the legislature had meant that, it would have said so." Thus, we must assume the legislature was aware of this standard for "arising out of" when it amended SDCL 62-1-1(7).
[ ] We find the legislature did not intend to increase the causal connection that is required to prove an injury arose out of the employment, but rather intended to raise the degree of proof required to show the condition complained of by the employee. We hold the "arising out of" standard still applies in proving an injury is related to employment.
[ ] 2. Whether Steinberg's injury arose out of her employment.
[ ] As there is no question of fact, the resolution of this issue becomes a matter of law for this Court. The circuit court recognized and DMVA conceded, Steinberg's injury occurred "in the course of" her employment because it occurred during her lunch break. Under our prior case law, there can be no question Steinberg's injury may be compensable even though it occurred during her lunch hour. See Piper v. Neighborhood Youth Corps, 90 SD 443, 241 NW2d 868, 869 (1976); Krier v. Dick's Linoleum Shop, 78 SD 116, 98 NW2d 486 (1959). However, the circuit court, applying the much higher standard of "major contributing cause," found that Steinberg's injury d
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