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Chavez v. City of San Antonio3/22/2000
court erred in finding he violated Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 752.004 because he brought material within six feet of the power line. Chavez contends he did not "bring" the limb within six feet of the line because it was already within six feet of the line when he began his work. We disagree.
" n some circumstances, words, no matter how plain, will not be construed to cause a result the Legislature almost certainly could not have intended." Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Tex. 1994), cited in City of Amarillo v. Martin, 971 S.W.2d 426, 428 n.1 (Tex. 1998). Where an application of the plain language of a statute leads to absurd results, we will not force a literal interpretation. See Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Tex. 1999); City of Amarillo, 971 S.W.2d at 430; Wende v. Board of Adjustment of City of San Antonio, 1999 WL 1124825 *4 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, n.p.h.).
It would be absurd to hold Chavez did not violate § 752.004 by performing work on a tree limb that was already within six feet of a power line, but find a violation occurs when a person whose work on a tree limb farther than six feet from a power line brings the limb within six feet of the line. The clear intent of the statutory scheme is to prevent persons from coming into contact, either directly or indirectly, with high voltage overhead lines. Chavez' interpretation of the statute would not advance that intent. We overrule Chavez' second issue. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 752.004-Constitutionality
In his third issue, Chavez argues the word "possible" renders Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 752.004 unconstitutionally vague. We disagree.
In determining whether a state statute is unconstitutionally vague, we begin with a presumption of validity and place the burden on the party urging unconstitutionality. See Sox v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. 1983); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Fuller, 892 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Tex. 1995). Where no constitutionally protected right is concerned, the party challenging the statute must show its operation is unconstitutional as applied to him. The fact that it may be unconstitutional as to others is not sufficient. See Schleuter v. City of Fort Worth, 947 S.W.2d 920, 931-32 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).
Most statutes "must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factual situations." Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 689 (Tex. 1980). As a practical matter, the Legislature must be allowed some flexibility of language so long as the public can determine what conduct is prohibited. See Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 689. Civil or regulatory statutes need only be reasonably certain. See id.; Rooms With a View, Inc. v. Private National Mortgage Ass'n, Inc., 7 S.W.3d 840, 845 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. filed). "Statutes are not automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language." See Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 689, quoting United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963). A reasonable reading of the statute reveals that persons and materials are prohibited within six feet of a high voltage overhead line unless prior arrangements have been made to de-energize the line. Chavez' conduct was clearly prohibited. Summary judgment was proper, not because Chavez might possibly have brought material within six feet of the line, but because he did so. See Schleuter, 947 S.W.2d at 931 ("A defendant cannot successfully challenge statute for vagueness when it clearly applies to his conduct.") Chavez' third issue is overruled.
Conclusion
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