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Davis v. City of Palestine2/28/2000
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF ANDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS
Harold and Patricia Davis ("the Davises") appeal the trial court's summary judgment granted in favor of the City of Palestine ("the City") on the Davises' claim of an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation. We affirm.
Background
In 1970, Willard Johnson either requested that the City install culverts on his property located in Palestine, or he installed them himself. That same year, Johnson constructed a building over the culverts. The Davises leased that building, used it as a Western Auto Store, and eventually purchased it and the underlying land. In 1991, an abnormally heavy rainfall occurred in Anderson County. It caused an unusually high water level in the culverts that ran under the Davises' building. The entire storm drainage system was overloaded, exceeding its normal design capacity. Subsequently, the culverts collapsed. As a result, the Davises contended that their building was severely damaged and that they were no longer able to run their Western Auto business.
The Davises filed suit against the City for negligence under the Texas Tort Claims Act and, in the alternative, for intentional acts which caused an unconstitutional taking. The City filed a motion for summary judgment on all causes of action, which the trial court granted. The Davises appealed, and this Court reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits. Thereafter, the Texas Supreme Court granted the City's petition for discretionary review. On review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case back to this Court based on its holding that damages for mental anguish resulting from property damage did not constitute a compensable personal injury for which a waiver of governmental immunity existed. We then affirmed the summary judgment with respect to the Davises' negligence cause of action, but reversed and remanded the judgment with respect to the Davises' inverse condemnation claim.
On remand, the Davises filed their Third Amended Original Petition. The City then filed a motion for summary judgment in which it argued that (1) the City did not intentionally take the building for public use, and (2) the statute of limitations barred the Davises' inverse condemnation claim. The trial court granted summary judgment on unspecified grounds, and this appeal followed.
Summary Judgment Standard of Review
In reviewing a traditional summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c), this Court must apply the standards established in Nixon v. Mr. Property Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985), which are:
1. The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true.
3. Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in its favor.
For a party to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, he must conclusively establish the absence of any genuine question of material fact and his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). A movant must either negate at least one essential element of the non-movant's cause of action, or prove all essential elements of an affirmative defense. Randall's Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995); MMP, Ltd. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. 1986). Since the burden of proof is on the movant, and all doubts about the existence
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