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Davis v. City of Palestine2/28/2000
used in its construction. And, the Davises admit that the City did not alter the drainage system in any manner after it was originally installed.
The City's summary judgment evidence also included (1) the deposition testimony of Harold Davis in which he asserts that the City's negligence caused the collapse of his building, (2) the affidavit of Harold Davis in which he attributed the damage to the City's failure to maintain the culverts, (3) the affidavit of Calvin T. Brannon, a professional engineer and land surveyor, in which he stated that the damage to the building resulted from a combination of factors, including the heavy rain and a poorly designed building, (4) an insurance report indicating that deteriorated culverts and lack of reinforcement in the floor slab contributed to the damage, and (5) a report prepared by W. T. Owen IV, which attributed the property damage to a combination of factors, including weight of the building and age deterioration of the culverts.
The Davises responded to the City's motion for summary judgment, but did not attach any evidence to raise a fact issue. Therefore, if the City disproved or negated any one of the three elements of inverse condemnation, it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Analysis
The proper manner in which to frame the issue in inverse condemnation cases is whether or not the governmental unit intentionally took or destroyed the property for a public use. See Texas Hwy. Dept. v. Weber, 219 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Tex. 1949). In the instant case, the summary judgment evidence established that, at worst, the City was negligent in maintaining and repairing the culverts. The damage to the Davises property was a result of natural rainfall, aging culverts, and a poorly designed building. It was not due to a conscious decision or an intentional action by a city official. The damage to the building was neither authorized by the City nor was it necessarily incidental to any action taken by the City. As we earlier stated, in order to bring a cause of action under inverse condemnation, the damage must not result from negligence. Likes, 962 S.W.2d at 504-05; see also Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 790 (Tex. 1980). Thus, we overrule issues one through four.
Because summary judgment was properly granted on the issue of intent, it is unnecessary that we address the City's statute of limitations argument. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
(DO NOT PUBLISH)
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