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Peterson v. Christie3/27/2000
UNPUBLISHED
At issue is whether RCW 4.16.180 applies here to toll the three-year statute of limitations for a personal injury action. Because respondents Christie neither departed from and resided out of the state after the action accrued nor concealed themselves, we affirm.
On August 5, 1995, Robert Peterson and David Christie were involved in a car accident in Bellevue. Christie was driving his parents' car when the accident occurred.
Prior to March 1995, David resided with his parents at 23402 SE 17th in Issaquah. That address was listed on David's driver's license at the time of the accident. In March 1995, David moved to 660 Wildwood Blvd. SW, Apt. A-3 in Issaquah. Within six months of the move, David informed the Department of Licensing of his new address. Moreover, that address has been listed in telephone directories from 1995 onward.
After unsuccessfully attempting to settle with the Christies' insurance company, Peterson filed a summons and complaint on August 4, 1998, one day before the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. The complaint named as defendants David and his parents, David and Barbara Christie.
On October 7, 1998, the Christies went on vacation to England for four weeks. They returned on November 6, 1998. The Christies were served on November 29, 1998, more than 90 days after the filing of the summons and complaint.
The Christies moved for summary judgment based on the running of the statute of limitations, and the trial court granted the motion. Peterson appeals.
Tolling
Peterson's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Christies based on the running of the statute of limitations. Specifically, he contends that the statute of limitations for commencing a personal injury action was tolled for the period the Christies were in Europe. A plain reading of the statute shows that he is incorrect.
We may affirm an order granting summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. All facts and reasonable inferences must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. We review de novo a trial court's application of a statute to undisputed facts.
The statute of limitations for a personal injury action is three years. Here, the statute of limitations accrued on August 5, 1995, the date of the accident. Thus, Peterson had until August 5, 1998 to commence his action against the Christies. He did so by filing a complaint. If an action is commenced by filing a complaint, the defendants shall be served, personally or by publication, within 90 days of the date of the filing in order to complete commencement of the action for purposes of the statute of limitations.
Because the Christies were not served until more than 90 days following the filing of the summons and complaint, we must decide if the tolling statute suspended the running of the statute while they were in England. RCW 4.16.180 states that:
If the cause of action shall accrue against any person who is a nonresident of this state, or who is a resident of this state and shall be out of the state, or concealed therein, such action may be commenced within the terms herein respectively limited after the coming, or return of such person into the state, or after the end of such concealment; and if after such cause of action shall have accrued, such person shall depart from and reside out of this state, or conceal himself, the time of his absence or concealment shall not be deemed or taken as any part of the time limit fo
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