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State v. Dennis3/27/2000
bby's medical expenses.
II. Appropriate Remedy
Dennis contends that the appropriate remedy upon reversal of a restitution order for failure of the State to present an adequate factual basis to support a restitution award is vacation of the restitution order. By contrast, the State argues that the remedy is remand for the consideration of additional evidence at a new restitution hearing that is limited to the issue of whether there was a causal connection between Dennis's offense and Officer Libby's injuries. This very issue was decided by this court in Dedonado, 991 P.2d 1219 (vacating portions of the restitution order because the State failed to establish a causal connection between defendant's actions and the damages).
'{U}nder the sentencing reform act, restitution is part of an offender's sentence and is primarily punitive in nature.' State v. Edelman, 97 Wn. App. 161, 166, 984 P.2d 421 (1999). Nonetheless, restitution also 'has a strong compensatory purpose' to provide reparation to victims. Id.; State v. Mead, 67 Wn. App. 486, 490, 836 P.2d 257 (1992). Notwithstanding court- ordered restitution, crime victims may pursue civil remedies against their offenders. RCW 9.94A.030(20); -.140(5); -142(6). Indeed, victims are only able to obtain 'damages resulting from mental anguish, pain and suffering, and other intangible losses' that normally require involved or sophisticated proof by bringing an action for civil damages. State v. Lewis, 57 Wn. App. 921, 925, 791 P.2d 250 (1990). But actions for personal injury are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080(2).
The sentencing court must determine an offender's restitution amount at the sentencing hearing or within 180 days of sentencing unless the court extends this period for good cause. State v. Tetreault, No. 43079-3-I, slip op. at 1-3 (Wash. App. Feb. 22, 2000); see also RCW 9.94A.142(1). If the court holds a restitution hearing and enters a restitution order after this time has expired, this court will vacate the restitution order. Tetreault, No. 43079-3-I, slip op. at 4; accord State v. Johnson, 96 Wn. App. 813, 818, 981 P.2d 25 (1999). Moreover, if the State fails to establish a causal connection between defendant's actions and the damages, this court must vacate the restitution order. Dedonado, 991 P.2d at 1219. The reason for this rule is that the State must not be given a further opportunity to carry its burden of proof after it fails to do so following a specific objection. Cf. State v. McCorkle, 137 Wn.2d 490, 496, 973 P.2d 461 (1999) (refusing to allow the State to introduce new evidence on remand to prove defendant's prior out-of-state convictions after the State failed to carry its burden of proof at sentencing).
In this case, the sentencing court held Dennis's restitution hearing and entered the restitution order within the 180-day-limit as required by RCW 9.94A.142. Thus, vacation of the order is not automatically required under Tetreault, No. 43079-3-I, slip op. at 4, and Johnson, 96 Wn. App. at 818. But as discussed above, the State failed to establish the required causal connection between Officer Libby's injuries and Dennis's assault after Dennis specifically objected at the restitution hearing. Thus, vacation of the $180.94 portion of the order for Officer Libby's medical expenses is required following Dedonado, 991 P.2d at 1219.
In sum, we affirm the sentencing court's $106.48 order for Officer Dornay's medical expenses, and vacate the sentencing court's $180.94 order for Officer Libby's medical expenses.
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