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State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive5/28/1999
The dispositive issue in this case is whether a complaint filed by the City of Gadsden, seeking, pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 20-2-93, the "condemnation and forfeiture" of property owned by Gary Stedham, ever invested the Etowah Circuit Court with subject-matter jurisdiction. We answer that question in the negative.
The substantive facts out of which this confiscation action arose are relatively simple. Gary Stedham owned real estate on which contraband was discovered by police officers. A criminal drug- possession charge against Stedham was presented to a grand jury, but ultimately the grand jury "no billed" the charge. For all that appears of record, Stedham will never be prosecuted for possession of the drugs seized on this occassion -- the alleged offense that forms the basis of the City's complaint.
On April 23, 1996, the City of Gadsden commenced this action in the Etowah Circuit Court, seeking the "condemnation and forfeiture" of the subject property, "in accordance with Section 20-2-93, Code of Alabama, 1975." On April 17, 1997, Stedham moved to dismiss the complaint "on the ground that the City lacked statutory authority" to commence this action. On July 24, 1997, the attorney general appointed the assistant city attorney to serve as a "Deputy Attorney General ... to represent the interests of the State of Alabama and the City of Gadsden." On July 30, 1997, the City and the State jointly moved the trial court to "amend the complaint in this cause to add the State of Alabama as a party plaintiff." The trial court granted that motion.
However, on December 30, 1997, the trial court dismissed this action, stating:
"The City of Gadsden, a Municipality, has no authority to file a condemnation and forfeiture action as such authority is granted only to the State pursuant to Alabama Code [1975,] Sections 20- 2-93 and 28-4-286 through 28-4-290." The City and the State appealed.
The appellants begin their argument by conceding that the City "does not have statutory authority to initiate a drug related condemnation action under § 20-2-93," because, they admit, § 20-2-93 "incorporate procedures set out in § 28-4-286, et seq., which specify that such an action is to be filed in the name of the State." Brief of Appellants, at 8 (emphasis added). Those sections provide in pertinent part:
§ 20-2-93:
"(a) The following are subject to forfeiture:"
"(8) All real property or fixtures used or intended to be used for the manufacture, cultivation, growth, receipt, storage, handling, distribution, or sale of any controlled substance in violation of any law of this state."
"(h) ... Except as specifically provided to the contrary in this section, the procedures for the condemnation and forfeiture of property seized under this section shall be governed by and shall conform to the procedures set out in Sections 28-4-286 through 28-4-290 ...."
§ 28-4-286:
"It shall be the duty of [the district attorney] in the county or the Attorney General of the state to institute at once or cause to be instituted condemnation proceedings in the circuit court by filing a complaint in the name of the state against the property seized ...."
The City and the State, however, contend that the amended complaint filed on July 30, 1997, added the State as the "real party in interest," within the meaning of Ala. R. Civ. P. 17. Consequently, they argue, any defect in the original complaint was cured by the amendment, which they insist, "relates back," pursuant to Ala. R. Civ. P. 15(c), to the date the original complaint was filed. Although they essentially concede that the City was not the rea
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