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SUNESON v. HOLLOWAY CONST. CO.5/27/1999
519 S.W.2d 782 (Tenn. 1975); Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1962); see also Thompson v. Coats, 547 P.2d 92 (Or. 1976); Hunt v. Blasins, 384 N.E.2d 368 (Ill. 1979); Totten v. Gruzen, 52 N.J. 202, 245 A.2d 1 (1968); Russell v. Arthur Whitcomb, Inc., 121 A.2d 781 (N.H. 1956); Pierce v. ALSC Architects, P.S., 890 P.2d 1254 (Mont. 1995); Lynch v. Norton Constr. Inc., 861 P.2d 1095 (Wyo. 1993); Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Hankins v. Elro Corp., 149 Mich. App. 22, 386 N.W.2d 163 (1986); Pastorelli v. Associated Eng'rs, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 159 (D.R.I. 1959); Kristek v. Catron, 7 Kan. App. 2d 495, 644 P.2d 480 (1982); Annotation, Negligence of Building or Construction Contractor as Ground of Liability Upon His Part for Injury or Damage to Third Person Occurring After Completion and Acceptance of the Work, 58 A.L.R.2d 865, 891 (1958 & Supp. 1994 & 1999) (citing cases in other jurisdictions supporting the view that a building or construction contractor is liable for injuries to, or the death of, third persons occurring after the completion of his work and its acceptance by the contractor where the work is reasonably certain to endanger third persons if negligently prepared or constructed). One authoritative treatise states its displeasure with the accepted-work rule in the following way:
In the case of builders and other contractors in construction work, a rule once prevailed that exonerated the contractor for injuries to third persons caused by defective construction but occurring after the employer had accepted the work. This will be recognized as an offspring of the privity rule and the last-wrongdoer rule. Both lines of holdings represent anachronistic and unwarranted exceptions to general negligence principles and are being progressively repudiated by the courts.
5 Harper, James & Gray, The Law of Torts, ยง 28.10 (2d ed. 1986) (footnotes omitted).
The Texas Supreme Court, in Strakos v. Gehring, abandoned the accepted-work doctrine in 1962 by rejecting the notion that although a contractor is found to have performed negligent work or left the premises in an unsafe condition and such action or negligence is found to be a proximate cause of injury , he must nevertheless be immune from liability solely because his work has been completed and accepted in an unsafe condition. Strakos, 360 S.W.2d at 790. The Texas court further indicated that the doctrine is simple but produces a harsh and unsound approach to the problem. It explained its reasons for rejecting the doctrine as follows:
The retention of the "accepted-work" doctrine would inevitably yield the same unwieldy results as have come about in virtually every other jurisdiction that has formally adhered to the rule. The rule eventually becomes enveloped by complex exceptions to cover such situations as nuisance, hidden danger, and inherently dangerous conditions. The result would be that in each case, after having first decided that there was an acceptance of the work, we would then have to decide issues involving all the various exceptions to the rule and in case any exception were found applicable, the basic issues of negligence and proximate cause would still remain for consideration. We believe that outright rejection of this oft-repudiated and emasculated doctrine would restore both logic and simplicity to the law.
Strakos, 360 S.W.2d at 791.
The Montana Supreme Court in Pierce v. ALSC Architects, P.S., 890 P.2d 1254 (Mont. 1995), offered an additional reason for rejecting the doctrine. There, the court held that the doctrine:
as the undesirable effect of shifting responsibility for negligent acts or omissions from the negligent party to an
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