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Martin v. Reinstein5/13/1999
took it on faith that there would be a genuine effort to treat the petitioners.
Unlike the trial Judge, I am not willing to trust the State on this point. The State's record in caring for and treating the mentally ill is not a good one. While I believe that the State is notorious for its indifference in this regard, there is more specific support for my skepticism. Ten years ago, in Arnold v. Department of Health Services, 160 Ariz. 593, 775 P.2d 521 (1989), our supreme court noted that Arizona was last among all of the states in providing care for the chronically mentally ill. The court found that both state and county governments had failed to provide mandated mental health care to such persons. The opinion, among other things, cited the testimony of an expert witness who said that there was "no system at all" and that what care that did exist was "chaotic." Id. at 599, 775 P.2d at 527. The supreme court upheld the trial court's order directing the respective agencies to provide the required care.
Ten years after the supreme court decided Arnold, that case remains open. The superior court retains jurisdiction of the matter in an attempt to see that the mandate for care is carried out. As recently as March 1 of this year, the Judge who oversees the case, during the course of a status conference, expressed concern about delay in implementing programs and sought additional information from the Department of Health Services and the Governor's Office regarding proposed funding. See Minute Entry dated March 1, 1999, in Arnold v. Sarn, No. C-432355 (Superior Court of Maricopa County). I see no reason to believe that the State will make any more real effort to treat these petitioners than it has made to treat the mentally ill who have proven to be relatively harmless.
In Conclusion, while I am not willing to say that the petitioners have carried their burden of demonstrating that the Act is unconstitutional because treatment is illusory, I would not proceed, when it is not necessary for the resolution of this matter, to entrench the notion that the treatment available is adequate to justify categorizing the Act as civil in nature.
THOMAS C. KLEINSCHMIDT, Judge
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