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Satilla Regional Medical Center v. Dixon5/27/1999
partial or incorrect reading and/or application of the evidence presented by [Dixon]." The superior court did not indicate what part of the record was not considered or which evidence was incorrectly read. The court further held that Dixon, "as a matter of law" gave appropriate notice of her injury. Satilla appeals from this order.
1.
On appeal of an award or denial of workers' compensation benefits, the superior court may not substitute its findings for the appellate division's findings of fact, and when sitting as an appellate body, it is bound by the "any evidence" standard of review and is not authorized to substitute its judgment as to weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. Owens-Brockway Packaging v. Hathorn, 227 Ga. App. 110, 111 (488 SE2d 495) (1997). Furthermore,
n reviewing a workers' compensation award, both this court and the superior court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing before the appellate division. (Punctuation omitted.) Southwire Co. v. Molden, 223 Ga. App. 389, 390 (477 SE2d 646) (1996). Satilla correctly argues that the superior court was bound to apply the "any evidence" standard of review and thus erred in holding that the State Board made its award on a partial or incorrect reading of the evidence. While there was some evidence to support Dixon's position, there was ample evidence to support the ALJ's findings that Dixon did not meet her burden of proving that the injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. See Zamora, supra. Accordingly, the superior court committed clear error in reversing on this ground.
2. Likewise, Satilla correctly argues that the superior court erred in ruling that, "as a matter of law," Dixon gave timely notice to her employer of her injury . OCGA ยง 34-9-80 requires that an employee give notice of an on-the-job injury to her employer within 30 days. Although the notice need not be in a particular format, it must at least "'put the employer on notice of the injury so that it may make an investigation if it sees fit to do so.' [Cit.]" Schwartz v. Greenbaum, 236 Ga. 476 (1) (224 SE2d 38) (1976). Here, again, the superior court erred in failing to apply the "any evidence" rule. Although the ALJ could have chosen to credit Dixon's testimony that she orally informed her supervisor of the injury three days after it allegedly occurred, he chose instead to credit the testimony of Dixon's supervisor and Satilla's risk manager. Under the "any evidence" rule, this finding should not have been disturbed and the award should have been affirmed on this ground.
For the foregoing reasons, the superior court erred in reversing the holding of the ALJ which was adopted by the full Board.
Judgment reversed.
Barnes, J., and Senior Appellate Judge Harold R. Banke concur.
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