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Mack v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company.5/18/1999
e on account of a mere failure to pay money under a contract. Id at 766-767. The Faircloth decision applies the long-standing common law rule, but states a suggestion that money "might" be considered to be tangible property under certain circumstances in language which is clearly dicta since contained in a digression with regard to a hypothetical allegation which was not actually raised in the case. In the case sub judice, the superior court cited Faircloth in connection with its assumption that money was tangible property but reliance upon that case was unnecessary, not only because of the dicta, but also because of the general rule that undefined words used in an insurance policy must be given their usual, ordinary and common meaning. Arkin v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, 228 Ga. App. 564, 566 (492 SE2d 314).
While Ms. Mack argues that there is substantial Georgia authority stating that money is tangible property, we do not agree. After closely examining the authority cited by Ms. Mack, we find nothing which may not be reconciled with our decision. At the same time, we acknowledge the absence of clear supporting authority perhaps because many controversies have been avoided by the classification of money as intangible personal property for tax purposes. See Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III (b) (1) of the Georgia Constitution of 1983 and OCGA ยง 48-1-2 (13).
Nonetheless, rather than avoiding this important issue, we apply the common meaning of the words involved to hold that money is not tangible property. The claims at issue in this case do not involve any specific coin or notes, and we do not intend that this decision affect those cases finding that specific metal or paper which represents money is tangible property. The distinction between a tangible item and monetary value is well set out in Vaughn v. Wright, 139 Ga. 736 (78 SE 123).
This brings us to the Conclusion that Mack's claim is not for "property damage" as defined in the insurance policy. We do not consider Ms. Mack's argument with regard to the loss of use of merchandise wrongfully repossessed since it is beyond the scope of the relief sought in her amended complaint. Also, we deny Ms. Mack's request to supplement the appellate record with an amendment to her complaint in the underlying action against Mercury, filed after the ruling of the superior court being appealed and after the filing of the notice of appeal initiating this appeal. There is no alternative theory under which coverage might be afforded under the insurance policy issued by plaintiff to Mercury, therefore the superior court correctly granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
Judgment affirmed. Andrews and Ruffin, JJ., concur.
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