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Khawaja v. Lane Company5/18/1999
ficer or that he be authorized to enter into contracts on behalf of the corporation. However, if the employee is not an officer or has not been expressly designated by the corporation to receive service, it is necessary that he or she occupy some position of managerial or supervisory responsibility within the organization. (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Whatley's Interiors, Inc. v. Anderson, 176 Ga. App. 406, 407 (336 SE2d 326) (1985).
Khawaja failed to show or point to any evidence showing that the receptionist occupied any managerial or supervisory responsibility within Realty Management. In fact, the undisputed affidavit testimony of Realty Management's president showed that the receptionist simply received and signed for mail and packages, was not an officer or director, and was not authorized to accept service on behalf of Realty Management. Because no evidence of agency was presented, the receptionist's alleged statements to the process server were not admissions. They were simply hearsay and had no probative value
Khawaja also argues that Tanner's Rome v. Ingram, 236 Ga. App. 275 (511 SE2d 617) (1999) controls the issue of whether the action in this case is barred by the failure to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-15 (c). We do not agree. In that case, an incorrectly named defendant was served a few weeks after the expiration of the two-year statute of limitation, and we affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The defendant originally named and served in the lawsuit was a sister corporation of the correct defendant, Tanner's Rome, and shared the same registered agent. Id. at 275. Tanner's Rome was substituted by consent order. Id. at 276. Because the two corporations were closely related, we concluded that valid service on the improperly named defendant, even after expiration of the statute of limitations, "was timely notice of the action, and the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-15 (c) were met." Id. at 276. We distinguished Tanner's Rome from Harrison v. Golden, 219 Ga. App. 772 (466 SE2d 890) (1996), "because in that case the substituted defendant and the existing defendant were unrelated." Tanner's Rome, supra at 276.
Khawaja appears to argue that because an incorrect defendant was named after the statute of limitations expired, and because summary judgment was properly denied to the correct defendant, summary judgment should also be denied here. But this argument ignores the basis for our decision in Tanner's Rome: the fact that the incorrectly named corporation and the correct corporation were related. We did not reach the issue of whether service was diligent such that late service related back to the date of filing. Id. at 276. Similarly, we do not reach that issue in this case. Here, as in Harrison, supra, and unlike Tanner's Rome, Realty Management and Lane Company Inc. were not related, and we therefore cannot conclude that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-15 (c) were met.
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