Amantiad v. Odum5/20/1999
0 to Amantiad and $13,000 to OTS, extinguishing OTS's existing workers' compensation lien rights under HRS § 386-8. All parties thereafter stipulated to dismiss the action with prejudice.
Amantiad's promise or agreement to "wash" his future workers' compensation benefits in exchange for the global settlement of his civil tort action implicates a dangerous commingling of and glaring conflict between the Director of Labor's original jurisdiction under HRS § 386-73 (1993) and this court's well-established support and fostering of settlement. We therefore must turn to HRS Chapter 386 to determine whether a compromise or "wash" of future workers' compensation benefits falls within the Director of Labor's original jurisdiction under HRS § 386-73 and, consequently, assuming that the circuit court otherwise has jurisdiction, to determine whether the circuit court can enforce a settlement regarding such benefits, absent the Director's prior consent or approval.
1. Statutory Interpretation
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewable de novo.["] Franks v. City & County of Honolulu, 74 Haw. 328, 334, 843 P.2d 668, 671 (1993). "When construing a statute, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. And we must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose. "When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists. "In construing an ambiguous statute, the meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning. HRS § 1-15(1)(1993). Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining the legislative intent. One avenue is the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool. Gray v. Administrative Dir. of the Court, 84 Hawaii 138, 148, 931 P.2d 580, 590 (1997) (internal citations, quotation marks, brackets, ellipses, and footnote omitted). "This court may also consider "the reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it[ ] . . . to discover its true meaning." Id. at 148 n.15, 931 P.2d at 590 n.15; HRS § 1-15(2) (1993). "Also, this court is bound to construe statutes so as to avoid absurd results. Keliipuleole v. Wilson, 85 Hawaii 217, 222, 941 P.2d 300, 305 (1997). "A rational, sensible and practicable interpretation of a statute is preferred to one which is unreasonable[,] impracticable . . . inconsisten , contradict , and illogical[ ]." Id. at 221-22, 941 P.2d at 304-05 (original brackets and citation omitted) (brackets added). Frank v. Hawaii Planning Mill Found., 88 Hawaii 140, 144, 963 P.2d 349, 353 (1998) (some brackets added and some in original).
We must further note that
" ur reporters are replete with cases holding that Hawaii's workers' compensation statute is remedial in nature. See, e.g., Locations, Inc. v. Hawaii Dept. of Labor & Indus. Relations, 79 Hawaii 208, 210, 900 P.2d 784, 786 (1995); Treloar v. Swinerton & Walberg Co., 65 Haw. 415, 425, 653 P.2d 420, 427 (1982); Evanson v. University of Hawaii, 52 Haw. 595, 483 P.2d 187 (1971). An equal number of cases have recognized that our workers' compensation statute has a beneficent purpose and should be afforded "liberal construction in favor of the employee, to fulfill the humanitarian purposes for which it was enacted." Respicio v. Waialua Sugar Co., 67 Haw. 16, 18, 675 P.2d 770, 772 (1984). Indeed, since the supreme c
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