Amantiad v. Odum5/20/1999
parties intended to settle. In re Estate of Engels, 10 Kan.App.2d 103, 692 P.2d 400 (1984). . . . ". . . . "Having found the settlement to be valid and enforceable, the terms of the settlement would control. . . ." Sylvester v. Animal Emergency Clinic of Oahu, 72 Haw. 560, 565-71, 825 P.2d 1053, 1056-59 (1992) (emphases added); see also Gossinger v. Association of Apartment Owners of the Regency of Ala Wai, 73 Haw. 412, 423-24, 835 P.2d 627, 633-34 (1992); Han v. Young, 84 Hawaii 162, 167-68, 931 P.2d 604, 609-10 (App. 1997).
With respect to a judgment by consent or an oral settlement entered on the record, the ICA has explained that
"courts have the general power of entering judgment by consent of the parties for the purpose of executing a compromise and settlement of the action." 47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 1080 (1969).
Although there is no case on point in Hawaii, the law of compromise and settlement and of judgment by consent is well-settled in other jurisdictions. For example, the Kansas Supreme Court has stated: "It is an elemental rule that the law favors compromise and settlement of disputes and generally, in the absence of bad faith or fraud, when parties enter into an agreement settling and adjusting a dispute, neither party is permitted to repudiate it." Matter of Estates of Thompson, 226 Kan. 437, 440, 601 P.2d 1105, 1108 (1979).
The Washington Supreme Court said it even more tersely:
"The law favors settlements and consequently it must favor their finality." Haller v. Wallis, 89 Wash.2d 539, 544, 573 P.2d 1302, 1305 (1978).
A compromise agreement, like other contracts, requires an offer and acceptance, consideration, and parties who have the capacity and authority to agree as they do. 15A Am.Jur.2d Compromise and Settlement § 7 (1976). A judgment or decree entered by consent of the parties is in the nature of a contract, approved by the court, and cannot be set aside except on grounds adequate to justify the rescission of a contract. Nieminen v. Pitzer, 281 Or. 53, 57, 573 P.2d 1227, 1228 (1978). . . . .
The Supreme Court of Colorado, quoting with approval from the case of Hansen v. Ryan, 186 S.W.2d 595 (Mo.1945), held:
"In the administration of Justice and the prompt dispatch of business, courts must and do act upon the statements of counsel and upon the stipulations of parties to pending causes. Where the parties have voluntarily entered into a stipulation which appears fair and reasonable for the compromise and settlement of the issues of a pending cause and where the stipulation is spread upon the record with the consent and approval of the court, as here, the parties are bound thereby and the court may, thereafter, properly proceed to dispose of the case on the basis of the pleadings, the stipulations and the admitted facts." Goltl v. Cummings, 152 Colo. 57, 380 P.2d 556, 559 (1963). Dowsett v. Cashman, 2 Haw. App. 77, 82-83, 625 P.2d 1064, 1068 (1981) (emphases added); accord Sylvester, 72 Haw. at 566, 825 P.2d at 1056.
3. A Compromise of Future Workers' Compensation Benefits Constitutes a Controversy or Dispute within the Director of Labor's Original Jurisdiction, under HRS §§ 386-8 and 386-73.
HRS Chapter 386 endows the Director of Labor with original jurisdiction over all controversies and disputes arising thereunder. In particular, HRS § 386-73 (1993) provides:
"Unless otherwise provided, the director of labor and industrial relations shall have original jurisdiction over all controversies and disputes arising under this chapter. The decisions of the director shall be enforceable by the circuit court as provided in section 386-91. There shall be a r
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