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Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper5/26/1999
during the foreclosure proceedings. Cf. Columbus Land, Loan & Bldg. Ass'n v. Wolken, 21 N. W. 2d 418, 424 (Neb. 1946) (stating that in a real estate foreclosure action, ""the execution of the contract, the breach thereof, the identity of the real estate described therein, and the amount remaining due thereon are material and necessary issues to be determined by the decree."" (emphasis added)).
Since the foreclosure proceeding would provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard and contest the amount due, I.C. § 42-2201 does not violate procedural due process. The Peipers have not overcome the strong presumption of validity afforded a duly passed statute. Therefore, we hold that the SRBA court did not err in its determination of this issue.
c. The Peipers failed to establish a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.
The Peipers' counterclaim states that ASCC's assessment against their property violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it seeks ""under the color of law, to deprive defendants of property without due process of law."" To establish violation of Section 1983, a plaintiff must show a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U. S. 42, 48 (1988).
The Peipers assert that irrigation districts act under color of state law, citing Dufur v. Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist., 128 Idaho 319, 912 P.2d 687 (Ct. App. 1996). Peipers argue that a Carey
Act operating company, like an irrigation district, is a ""creature of the state and the subject of substantial assistance on operating procedures, enforcement of maintenance liens, tax benefits, and the like."" The Peipers further argue that the inability of Carey Act operating company stockholders to exercise similar rights is violative of both procedural and substantive due process. This argument is unpersuasive. While Carey Act operating companies are similar to irrigation districts in some respects, they are materially different in their organization and regulation. Section 6-902(2) of the Idaho Code classifies irrigation districts as political subdivisions of the state, which are inherently state actors. The irrigation district's status as a state actor was so obvious that the issue of whether the irrigation district operated under color of state law was not even discussed in the Dufur decision.
Operating companies like ASCC, however, are privately owned corporations, and as such act under color of state law only where there is significant state involvement in the action. See Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F. 2d 380, 382 (9th Cir. 1983). When determining whether a private party acts under color of state law, "the circumstances surrounding the private eviction must be examined in their totality." Id. at 384. In Howerton, the Court found that a private landlord acted under color of state law when police officers actively participated in the illegal eviction of tenants. Id. at 385. There was no such state involvement in ASCC's assessment or foreclosure against Peipers' property.
Neither does the receipt of governmental benefits necessarily make ASCC a ""creature of the state."" See Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp. 799, 803 (D. Idaho 1973) (holding that the fact that a hospital received tax exempt status from state, was licensed by state and applied for and received state and federal monies under Medicare and Medicaid programs would not support finding that hospital was clothed with state controls so as to be acting under color of state law), aff'd, 520 F. 2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975).
In order to find that ASCC, a private cor
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