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Green v. North Arundel Hospital Association Inc.5/26/1999
1985); Marks v. Mobil Oil Corp., 562 F. Supp. 759, 768 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 727 F.2d 1100 (3rd Cir. 1984); Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 940 P.2d 201, 204 (Okla. 1997). Although there is no Maryland case law specifying the circumstances under which the exclusion of a party from trial offends due process, many courts faced with this issue have adopted the reasoning used by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Helminski. See, e.g., Hines v. Wilkinson, 163 F.R.D. 262, 265-68 (S.D. Ohio 1995); Province v. Center for Women's Health & Family Birth, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 667, 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that Helminski "surveyed, considered, and discussed the rules which had been applied to a broad range of cases" dealing with the exclusion of parties from trial); Cary, 940 P.2d at 205; Bremner v. Charles, 821 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Or. 1991), modified by, 832 P.2d 454 (Or. 1992).
In Helminski, the plaintiffs alleged that the minor plaintiff's mother's exposure during pregnancy to a surgical anesthetic manufactured by the defendant caused injury to the minor's nervous system when he was a fetus. See 766 F.2d at 210. The defendants moved to exclude the minor from trial, arguing that his appearance before the jury would be prejudicial to their case. See id. at 213. At the time of trial, the minor required twenty-four hour a day care, did not speak, was not toilet trained, and had an extremely low IQ. See id. at 210. The trial Judge bifurcated the proceedings and excluded the minor from the liability phase of the trial. See id. at 211. On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the exclusion of the minor deprived him of his Fifth Amendment right to due process. See id. at 213.
The Helminski court held that, although a plaintiff does not have an absolute right to be present in the courtroom, due process prevents a court from arbitrarily excluding a party from trial. See id. According to the court, in cases where the plaintiff has a severe injury that may potentially prejudice the jury and the plaintiff is unable to comprehend the proceedings or aid counsel, exclusion of the plaintiff does not offend due process. See id. at 217. The court stated:
"Although under some circumstances the mere sight by a jury of a severely injured plaintiff may evoke juror sympathy, juror sympathy alone is insufficient to establish juror prejudice. Generally, the jury will follow the court's instructions and fulfill its promise to decide the case solely on the facts. On the other hand, there may be occasions when the mere presence of a party would render the jury unable to arrive at an unbiased judgment concerning liability. Should such a case arise and the presence of the party would not aid the fair administration of Justice, the trial court can exclude the plaintiff or limit his presence. A party's involuntary exclusion under these circumstances would not constitute a denial of due process. Nevertheless, absent disruptive behavior, involuntary exclusion of a party who is able to comprehend the proceedings and aid counsel would constitute a denial of due process since exclusion of such party would deny him the right to obtain a fair trial." Id.; see also Morley v. Superior Court, 638 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Ariz. 1981) (holding that plaintiff, who was comatose, required a tracheostomy to breathe, was fed via a feeding tube, was unable to communicate with his lawyers, and was properly excluded from liability phase of trial because his presence would prejudice the jury); Dickson v. Bober, 130 N.W.2d 526, 530 (Minn. 1964) (holding that because plaintiff was unable to testify or comprehend the proceedings, he possessed no absolute right to be present at trial so long as his rights were protected by his att
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