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New Orleans Tanker Corp. v. Department of Transportation4/28/1999
occurred and caused damage to the plaintiff's property. See Triple C. Railcar, 630 A.2d at 630. The Delaware Supreme Court noted that it had previously utilized the principle of ejusdem generis to interpret "other machinery or equipment," and concluded that the equipment exception to immunity could not be allowed to "swallow the rule" and was limited to machinery or equipment that posed risks to the public because of its high mobility or inherent dangerousness. See id. at 631-32. It held that the tidegate was not included within the term "other machinery or equipment." Id. at 632.
Strictly construing the exceptions to immunity, we do not agree that the bridge leaf machinery is included within the phrase "other machinery or equipment," in 14 M.R.S.A. ยง 8104-A(1)(G). Therefore, the trial court did not err by dismissing the complaint.
The entry is
Judgment affirmed.
DANA, J., with whom ALEXANDER, J., joins, Dissenting.
I respectfully Dissent.
I disagree with the Court's Conclusion that "other machinery or equipment, whether mobile or stationary" must be capable of transportation like those enumerated items in section 8104-A(1)(A) through (F). We have stated, with respect to section 8104-A(1)(G) that " ll definitions are perilous. Particularly since the legislative history of this statute is far from clear, we hesitate to announce an all-inclusive construction of one of its major provisions." McNally v. Town of Freeport, 414 A.2d 904, 906 (Me. 1980) (footnote omitted). The Court's decision does just that by limiting section 8104-A(1)(G) to items capable of transportation, excluding, among other items, machinery or equipment affixed to permanent structures. This ignores both the intent of the Legislature -- for if it intended to limit section 8104-A(1)(G) to equipment capable of transportation, it could have said so --and this Court's traditionally cautious approach in defining the scope of section 8104-A(1)(G). On four different occasions we have interpreted whether stationary equipment qualified as "other machinery or equipment," and each time we declined to adopt the narrow interpretation endorsed by the Court today. See J.R.M., Inc. v. City of Portland, 669 A.2d 159, 161 (Me. 1995) (building's fire protection system); Harris v. City of Old Town, 667 A.2d 611, 613 (Me. 1995) (railroad tracks); Petillo v. City of Portland, 657 A.2d 325, 327 (Me. 1995) (automatic watering system); McNally, 414 A.2d at 906 (hypodermic syringe).
The Court limits the scope of items in section 8104-A(1)(G) to items capable of transportation, whether moving or stationary at the time of the negligence. The definition misconstrues the meaning of the phrase "whether mobile or stationary." If the State negligently parks a motor vehicle on a highway and causes an injury, section 8104-A(1)(A) applies even though the motor vehicle was not moving at the time of the accident. Likewise, if the State negligently operates "other machinery or equipment" by placing movable equipment on a highway and causing an accident, section 8104-A(1)(G) applies even though the machinery is not moving at the time of the accident. Therefore, if the phrase "whether mobile or stationary" means "moving or stationary at the time of the negligence," then it is redundant. Instead, I would interpret the phrase "whether mobile or stationary" to include machinery or equipment that is incapable of movement and always stationary.
The Court limits equipment in section 8104-A(1)(G) to items capable of transportation and thereby renders our traditional test analyzing the risks resulting from negligent use superfluous. The traditional test for determining if an item falls
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