Jacobsen v. State4/28/1999
rsuant to the resolution, Assistant Attorney General John P. Connor, Jr., was appointed as Special Deputy County Attorney. The resolution also allowed Assistant Attorney General Matthew F. Heffron to act in place of Connor.
. Nearly one year later, on October 5, 1990, Heffron filed a complaint against Jacobsen in Butte-Silver Bow Justice Court. Jacobsen was arrested pursuant to a warrant, then released on bond after spending three hours in jail. On October 16, 1990, Heffron obtained leave to file an information in the District Court.
. On October 18, 1990, an information was filed in the Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County, charging Jacobsen with one felony count of theft, one felony count of filing false claims, five felony counts of fraudulently obtaining dangerous drugs by confiscating prescription drugs and medications of deceased individuals, and two misdemeanor counts of official misconduct. Jacobsen filed a motion to dismiss the information, which was denied. Jacobsen, thereafter, pled not guilty to all charges. The District Court suspended Jacobsen from his position as coroner pursuant to ยง 45-7-401(4), MCA.
. On January 7, 1991, the case proceeded to trial. During the trial, the District Court dismissed several of the counts against Jacobsen and on January 11, 1991, the jury acquitted him on the remaining charges. The District Court ordered that Jacobsen be reinstated into his position as coroner and be paid retroactively for the three months he was suspended. One and one-half years later, Jacobsen sought re-election as coroner, but lost.
. The parties disagreed whether the appeal and cross-appeal were subject to a Rule 54, M.R.App.P., mediation requirement. Nonetheless, on January 15, 1998, this Court ordered the parties to mediation. Mediation was held, but no resolution was reached. The mediator demanded that Jacobsen pay one-third of the mediation costs. Jacobsen paid this under protest, which he also appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
. On appeal from a summary judgment, this Court reviews a case de novo based on the same criteria applied by the district court. See Stutzman v. Safeco Ins. Co. (1997), 284 Mont. 372, 376, 945 P.2d 32, 34 (citing Treichel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1997), 280 Mont. 443, 446, 930 P.2d 661, 663). Thus,
" he movant must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Once this has been accomplished, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to prove by more than mere denial and speculation that a genuine issue does exist. Having determined that genuine issues of material fact do not exist, the court must then determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [This Court] reviews the legal determination made by a district court as to whether the court erred." Stutzman, 284 Mont. at 376, 945 P.2d at 34 (quoting Bruner v. Yellowstone County (1995), 272 Mont. 261, 264-65, 900 P.2d 901, 903).
. Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., controls the procedure to be followed in a summary judgment proceeding. Rule 56(e), M.R.Civ.P., requires that "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleadings, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." See also HKM Associates v. Northwest Pipe Fittings, Inc. (1995), 272 Mont. 187, 193, 900 P.2d 302, 305-06 (quoting Koepplin v. Zortman Mining (1994), 267 Mont. 53, 59, 881 P.2d 1306, 1309). We have stated that an opposing party "has an affirmative duty to respond by affidavits or other sworn testimony containing material facts th
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Montana Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|