Jacobsen v. State4/28/1999
at raise genuine issues; conclusory or speculative statements will not suffice." Klock v. Town of Cascade (1997), 284 Mont. 167, 174, 943 P.2d 1262, 1266 (quoting Groshelle v. Reid (1995), 270 Mont. 443, 447, 893 P.2d 314, 316).
. As previously stated, our review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. If we agree with the Conclusions of the district court, we can affirm the district court's decision, if correct, regardless of its reasons. See Norman v. City of Whitefish (1993), 258 Mont. 26, 30, 852 P.2d 533, 535; District No. 55 v. Musselshell County (1990), 245 Mont. 525, 527, 802 P.2d 1252, 1253; Jerome v. Pardis (1989), 240 Mont. 187, 192, 783 P.2d 919, 922.
DISCUSSION
. At the outset, it is important that we note the status of the record that is before us. The respondents strenuously argue that many of the exhibits presented by the appellant to support his allegations are not properly authenticated, nor do his affidavits comply with the requirements of Rule 56(e), M.R.Civ.P. We agree that some of the appellant's allegations are not sufficiently supported in the record. We shall address the following issues on appeal without specifically noting the inadequacies of appellant's supporting documentation, but will conduct our review only giving consideration to what is properly authenticated in the record.
ISSUE 1
. Did Butte-Silver Bow County exercise a valid grant of authority when it appointed Assistant Attorney General John P. Connor, Jr., as Special Deputy County Attorney pursuant to Resolution 1196?
. Article XI, Section 6, of the Montana Constitution, provides that " local government unit adopting a self-government charter may exercise any power not prohibited by this constitution, law, or charter." Section 7 of Article XI further provides that " nless prohibited by law or charter, a local government unit may . . . transfer or delegate any function, power, responsibility, or duty of any officer to . . . the state."Jacobsen argues that Butte-Silver Bow County was prohibited from passing Resolution 1196 by § 7-4-2705, MCA. This statute states that
" xcept in counties of the first class, the board of county commissioners has the power, whenever in its judgment the ends of Justice or the interest of the county require it, to employ or authorize the county attorney to employ special counsel to assist in the prosecution of any criminal case pending in such county or to represent said county in any civil action in which such county is a party."
The parties do not dispute that Butte-Silver Bow County is a first class county.
. Jacobsen asserts that the first class county exclusion in § 7-4-2705, MCA, is based on the premise that first class counties already have full-time county attorneys who are compensated adequately to handle all criminal cases. He further argues that absent a source of authority other than Resolution 1196, the respondents failed to act within a proper legal scope.
. In contrast, the respondents contend that § 7-4-2705, MCA, did not prohibit Butte-Silver Bow County from passing Resolution 1196. They cite D & F Sanitation Service v. City of Billings (1986), 219 Mont. 437, 445, 713 P.2d 977, 982, in which we said that the authority of self-governed local governmental units can be limited only when expressly prohibited by law. See also § 7-1-102, MCA. The respondents argue that since § 7-4-2705, MCA, does not expressly prohibit a first class county from authorizing special counsel to assist in a prosecution, Resolution 1196 was a valid grant of authority. In the alternative, they argue that § 7-4-2705, MCA, must be liberally construed in light of
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