 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Massengill v. Duke University Medical Center5/18/1999
Appeal by plaintiff James D. Massengill from judgment entered 21 July 1998 by Judge Dexter Brooks, Superior Court, Johnston County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 April 1999.
On 6 June 1995, Jamie Massengill was admitted to Duke University Hospital for emergency surgery and further care relating to injuries he suffered during an automobile collision that day. At the time Massengill was admitted to Duke Hospital, Peter Knutson worked in the cancer/oncology unit as a licensed physicians' assistant.
In this action, Massengill contends that on 9 and 10 June 1995, Knutson came into his hospital room, told him that he was going to examine his surgical incisions, and thereafter committed unlawful sexual acts upon him--touched his genitals, placed his fingers inside his rectum, and committed fellatio upon him. Undisputedly, Duke did not assign or instruct Knutson to provide medical care to Massengill. Knutson, however, did have access to Massengill by way of his employment.
As a result of the alleged unlawful acts, Massengill brought a medical malpractice action against Duke University Medical Center d/b/a Duke University Hospital, Private Diagnostic Clinic as an alleged joint venturer with Duke Hospital, and Knutson as an alleged agent of Duke Hospital and Private Diagnostic Clinic. Thereafter, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Knutson concluding that he was not providing professional services necessary to support a medical malpractice claim.
On appeal, Massengill contends that the trial court erred in granting Knutson's Motion for Summary Judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Knutson acted unlawfully while performing "professional services" for Massengill.
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c)(1990). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Hinson v. Hinson, 80 N.C. App. 561, 563, 343 S.E.2d 266, 268 (1986). Although the granting of summary judgment is a drastic remedy, it is appropriate if the moving party meets the burden of proving that an essential element of the non-moving party's claim is nonexistent. See LaBarre v. Duke Univ., 99 N.C. App. 563, 565, 393 S.E.2d 321, 323, disc. review denied, 327 N.C. 635, 399 S.E.2d 122 (1990).
A medical malpractice action is one "for damages for personal injury or death arising out of the furnishing or failure to furnish professional services in the performance of medical, dental or other health care by a health care provider." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.11 (Supp. 1996). Both parties concede that Knutson, as a licensed physicians' assistant, is a "health care provider" under the statute. Indeed, the sole issue raised on appeal is whether Knutson committed the unlawful acts while furnishing "professional services" to Massengill. We hold that Knutson was not furnishing Massengill "professional services," an essential element under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.11, and therefore the trial court properly found that a medical-malpractice action may not be maintained against Knutson.
Although the legislature failed to define the term "professional services" as set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.11, our Supreme Court has stated that "the term `professional services' refers to `those services where a professional relationship exists between plaintiff and defendant--such as a physician-patient or atto
Page 1 2 North Carolina Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|