 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Taylor v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.5/18/1999
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.
TAYLOR v. STATE FARM
___P.2d___
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS FROM A FEDERAL COURT
Insureds brought an action against their insurer in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma to recover under a homeowner's policy for hail-related damage to their roof and for bad-faith refusal to settle that loss. The district court (a summarily ruled in favor of the insurer on the contract theory of liability; (b allowed the trial to proceed on the tort theory; (b entered judgment on jury verdict for the insureds on the ex delicto theory of liability and (c granted insureds, under the authority of 36 O.S.1991 § 3629(B, a counsel-fee award, costs and prejudgment interest. The insurer appealed for corrective relief only from the award of attorney's fee, costs and prejudgment interest. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified to this court two questions of state law, deeming them to be unsettled by extant Oklahoma precedent.
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS ANSWERED.
In conformity to the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ("certifying court") submitted the following questions:
"(1) To what extent, if any, does Brashier v. Farmers Insurance Co. . . . preclude trial court allowance of attorney fees and prejudgment interest under Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 3629(B) in insurance bad faith cases in which the insured does not also recover on a contract claim?"
"(2) Following Brashier, are insurance bad faith claimants proceeding under Oklahoma law precluded from recovering attorney's fee and prejudgment interest in cases in which a claim is predicated on tort rather than contract?"
As we understand the first question, it calls for an answer to whether Brashier construes the terms of 36 O.S.1991 § 3629(B) to bar an award of attorney's fee and prejudgment interest in actions rested on a theory other than ex contractu. We answer in the negative. Recovery authorized by § 3629(B) embraces both contract- and tort-related theories of liability so long as the "core element" of the damages sought and awarded is composed of the insured loss. Brashier does not address itself to the insured's right to recover, under § 3629, prejudgment interest on an award for the insured property loss. Prejudgment interest on an insured property-loss recovery - as an additional item of damages to the insured - is authorized by the terms of § 3629(B), to be construed together with those of 23 O.S. 1991 § 6, whenever (a) the insured is the prevailing party and (b) the damages for loss were capable of ascertainment by reference to well-established market values. In that context prejudgment interest is deemed to be a statutorily added item of damages.
As we understand the second question, it asks that we answer whether Brashier may be construed to bar the § 3629 recovery of counsel-fee award and prejudgment interest in actions prosecuted solely on the theory of insurer's bad-faith refusal to settle. We declare that Brashier does not bar a counsel-fee award in tort claims for bad-faith refusal to settle a property loss. A prevailing party's counsel fee also may be viewed as an element of the insured's recovery for the insurer's bad-faith refusal to settle the claim. In short, it does not rest solely on the § 3629 authority. The right of an insured to recover prejudgment interest on the insured property loss (awarded in a bad-faith t
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 Oklahoma Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|