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Munn v. Steel5/24/1999
from the date of "an injury" and thus implies that payment for medical treatment in cases of permanent disability would be paid only if related to the original compensable injury. See Pearson v. JPS Converter & Indus. Corp., 327 S.C. 393, 489 S.E.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, (Feb. 5, 1998) (holding that § 42-15-60 permitted a permanently disabled claimant to continue receiving medical treatment for a traumatic brain injury incurred in the work-related accident).
Furthermore the general definition of "injury" and "personal injury " under our workers' compensation law "shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment and shall not include a disease in any form, except when it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident . . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160 (Supp. 1998). It naturally follows that any medical treatment claimed under § 42-15-60 must be causally related to the "injury by accident" arising out of and in the course of employment. Consequently, we find the only logical application of § 42-15-60 is that Munn is not entitled to additional benefits because the medical treatment stemming from his heart condition is not causally related to the workers' compensation injury he suffered in 1986.
Munn relies on Rice v. Froehling & Robertson, Inc., 267 S.C. 155, 226 S.E.2d 705 (1976) and Smith v. American & Effird Mills, 277 S.E.2d 83 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) to support his position that he is entitled to additional benefits. Both cases are distinguishable on their facts. Unlike this case, Rice and Smith involved claimants who sought medical treatment for injuries directly related to their original compensable injury . These cases did not reach the issue of whether a claimant is entitled to lifetime medical treatment where the treatment is unrelated to the original compensable injury.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the circuit court is AFFIRMED.
HEARN and HOWARD, JJ., concur.
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