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In re Cobos5/27/1999
Relators Arturo and Julia Cobos and the City of Edinburg petition this Court for a writ of mandamus compelling the Honorable Rose Reyna, Judge of the 206th Judicial District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, to dismiss the underlying lawsuit for want of jurisdiction. Relators have properly certified that they have complied with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.10(a).
On January 13, 1992, the real parties-in-interest filed a personal injury and wrongful death lawsuit against relators and ten others in an action springing from an automobile accident in Edinburg, Texas. On July 25, 1997, Judge Evins signed an agreed judgment memorializing a settlement reached between all plaintiffs and Alfonso and Maria Solis, two of the (then) thirteen defendants. The judgment contained so-called "Mother Hubbard" language which provided: "Any and all relief prayed for by any party to this suit and not specifically awarded is hereby in all things denied." On April 23, 1998, relators filed a motion to dismiss the cause from the docket for want of jurisdiction on the basis that the July 25, 1997 judgment was final and, further, that the trial court's plenary power had expired as had the applicable timetables for appeal. Judge Reyna disagreed and, almost a year later, denied the motion by written order dated April 12, 1999, and retained the case on her docket.
Relators request that this Court compel Judge Reyna to dismiss the lawsuit on the basis that she is without jurisdiction to act, having entered a final judgment disposing of all issues and all parties almost two years ago.
The Texas Government Code authorizes this Court to issue writs of mandamus. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. ยง 22.221 (b) (Vernon Supp. 1999). Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only in limited circumstances to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the violation of a duty imposed by law when the Relator has no adequate remedy at law. Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tex. 1997); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-44 (Tex. 1992). A trial court has no discretion to determine matters of law or to apply the law to the facts incorrectly. Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 437 (Tex. 1997); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. A relator complaining the trial court incorrectly decided an issue of law must show the trial court failed to analyze or apply the law correctly because the trial court's erroneous interpretation of the law constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 927 (Tex. 1996); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. Mandamus is proper if the trial court's order is void. Dikeman v. Snell, 490 S.W.2d 183, 186-87 (Tex. 1973); see Richie v. Heard, 611 S.W.2d 419, 420 (Tex. 1981) (mandamus proper when trial court retained jurisdiction following expiration of plenary power).
Relators argue Mafridge v. Ross, 590 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1996), and Inglish v. Union State Bank, 945 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1997), compel the Conclusion that the July 25 agreed order, because of its Mother Hubbard language, was final and appealable as to all parties and issues. Following the expiration of the trial court's plenary power, the trial court lost jurisdiction in this cause. The real parties-in-interest argue the July 25 judgment disposed only of the claims against defendants Alfonso and Maria Solis as recited in paragraph one of that order. Citing the trial court's April 12, 1999 order as proof the trial court did not intend to issue a final judgment as to all parties in this lawsuit, the real parties-in-interest argue that applying Mafridge and Inglish to the case at hand elevates form over substance and would work an inJustice.
As Mafridge and Inglish make clear, the i
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