 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Trigo v. Munoz5/6/1999
Appellant Manuel Trigo suffered a take-nothing summary judgment following his intervention in a lawsuit in which appellee law firm, Muñoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P. (Muñoz) was a third-party defendant. Trigo complains the trial court erred in granting Muñoz's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
The facts before us are relatively straightforward. Trigo agreed to represent Mrs. Petra Lopez in a claim for the wrongful death of her husband, Tereso Lopez. Mrs. Lopez signed a contract in which she agreed to pay Trigo a forty percent contingency fee. Trigo referred the claim to Muñoz with an oral agreement to evenly split any attorney's fees recovered. Muñoz then signed the decedent's five adult children as clients and filed a claim against Tri-Pack Machinery Services, Inc. naming Lopez and the five children individually as plaintiffs. When Tri-Pack's insurer declared bankruptcy , Muñoz reached a settlement agreement with the State of Texas Guaranty Fund for the maximum recovery available, $100,000. That agreement provided that Lopez and the other five plaintiffs would share in the sum equally, receiving $16,666.66 apiece, less expenses.
Considering the minimal amount of the recovery in light of so grievous a loss, the Muñoz law firm agreed to take no fee for legal services and charged only the actual costs, to be borne equally by the six plaintiffs. Trigo declined Muñoz's request that he, too, waive his fee, so Muñoz tendered Trigo a check in the amount of $3,333.33, representing fifty percent of the attorney's fees attributable to Mrs. Lopez (half of the 40% contingent fee of Lopez's $16,666.66).
Believing he had been swindled, Trigo intervened in the lawsuit, filing claims against Muñoz, all the plaintiffs, and Tri-Pack Machinery, claiming twenty percent of the total recovery. The gist of his complaint was that he had referred Lopez to Muñoz so that Lopez could properly represent all claimants under Texas's wrongful death statute. Accordingly, he believed that he was entitled to fifty percent of all attorney's fees calculated against the entire sum recovered, regardless of plaintiff, and not merely Lopez's share. He claimed that the parties had perpetrated a fraud against him by structuring the settlement to reduce the amount to which he was entitled.
Muñoz moved for summary judgment on the basis that Trigo had never represented the five adult children and was not entitled to recover attorney's fees for their representation. Muñoz also argued that Trigo's fraud claim must fail as a matter of law. The trial court granted Muñoz's motion without comment.
To prevail on a summary judgment motion, a movant must establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam). In reviewing a summary judgment, we must accept as true evidence in favor of the non-movant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving all doubts in the non-movant's favor. Nixon v. Mr. Property Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). When a trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied on for its ruling, an appellate court will affirm a summary judgment if any of the theories advanced are meritorious. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989).
The original contract between Trigo and Muñoz was oral, but was memorialized in a letter dated September 3, 1992, from John Tippit of the law firm of Muñoz, Hockema & Reed to Trigo. The body of the letter states:
"Recently, your secretary called our office and asked us to send a letter to you confir
Page 1 2 3 Texas Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|