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Day v. State5/11/1999
ive." Berry, 717 P.2d at 680. In this case, we can look to the legislative history of the bill that amended ยง 63-30-7 to bar the action against the government agency to determine the reason for its enactment and whether the abrogation was "an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving" the elimination of a "clear social or economic evil." Berry, 717 P.2d at 680.
Senator Richard Carling, the sponsor of Senate Bill 194, explained the reason for the bill on the Senate floor:
"Mr. President, this is a bill that came to us from the law enforcement community. They are being bothered by frivolous lawsuits now, by individuals not particularly in Utah, but this is a rash that started especially in California. . . . But because of the rash of suits mainly to try to get the government entity to come up with some money and settle these types of cases, suits have been filed. We want to put in statute what we understand to be the common law rule that if a police vehicle is chasing a suspect, and that suspect is involved in an accident, that there will not be liability to the police department or to the local government unless there was a reckless disregard of the safety of the public and therefore they would be able to come back against the police agency for that reason. . . . We understand that is the common law, and it merely to try to stop some frivolous lawsuits that are being filed harassing government and police entities." See Senate debate, Senator Richard J. Carling, S.B. 194, February 4, 1990.
On its face, this statement identifies no social, economic, or any other "evil" in Utah. The problem identified by the sponsor of the amendment was a "rash" of "frivolous lawsuits" in California. No evidence was presented showing that Utah had experienced a similar rash of such frivolous lawsuits. Indeed, the sponsor made clear that the basis for the amendment was the situation in California, but "not particularly in Utah." In other words, the Legislature was not acting to obviate a "clear social evil" in Utah. See Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 583-88 (Utah 1993) (holding unconstitutional legislative abrogation of remedies based on economic and social problems that had occurred in other states but not in Utah).
Nor was there any showing that such an evil was likely to occur in Utah. Indeed, the fact that there was truly no factual basis for the abrogation of plaintiff's remedy is convincingly shown by the Legislature's repeal of the Act a little more than one year after its enactment and six weeks after the accident in issue.
Finally, Senator Carling's statement in support of the amendment misstated the actual effect of the amendment. Senator Carling stated that the amendment was intended to enact "the common law rule" that where a police vehicle chases a suspect and that suspect is involved in an accident, there is no liability unless the officer was engaged in "reckless disregard of the safety of the public." That clearly was not the effect of the amendment. In fact, it imposed an absolute bar to such an action, whether based on recklessness or some other standard. In truth, the stated factual and legal bases justifying the amendment were simply in error, as is evident from its quick repeal. The stated basis for the abrogation of the remedy had no foundation. It follows that the Act barring the action for the time it was in effect was unconstitutional.
Reversed and remanded to the district court for trial.
Associate Chief Justice Durham and Justice Russon concur in Justice Stewart's opinion.
Chief Justice Howe concurs in the result.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice, Dissenting:
I Dissent fro
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