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Day v. State5/11/1999
rt can more clearly define the scope of each body of law and the policies that underlie them. If Officer Colyar owed no duty of care to the Days, there can be no prima facie case of negligence as a matter of law, and immunity would be immaterial. See Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 887 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1994); Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1162 & n.3; see also Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 842 P.2d 832, 836 n.1 (Utah 1992) (Stewart, J., Dissenting).
The State denies that it or Officer Colyar owed a duty of care to the Days. It relies on the position that the State's "public duties" cannot be the basis for a tort duty of due care that runs to specific individuals who are harmed by governmental action. The law states, "For a governmental agency and its agents to be liable for negligently caused injury suffered by a member of the public, the plaintiff must show a breach of a duty owed him as an individual, not merely the breach of an obligation owed to the general public at large by the governmental official." Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151. The State denies that it owes any duty of care to third persons who are injured by a collision with one fleeing arrest, irrespective of the reason for the pursuit.
The public duty doctrine provides that although a government entity owes a general duty to all members of the public, that duty does not impose a specific duty of due care on the government with respect to individuals who may be harmed by governmental action or inaction, unless there is some specific connection between the government agency and the individuals that makes it reasonable to impose a duty. See, e.g., DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 440 n.12 (Utah 1995); Madsen v. Borthick, 850 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1993); South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1855).
At least four circumstances may give rise to a special relationship between the government and specific individuals. A special relationship can be established (1) by a statute intended to protect a specific class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member from a particular type of harm; (2) when a government agent undertakes specific action to protect a person or property; (3) by governmental actions that reasonably induce detrimental reliance by a member of the public; and (4) under certain circumstances, when the agency has actual custody of the plaintiff or of a third person who causes harm to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996) (city's maintenance of fence along waterway); Rollins v. Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1991) (mental hospital patient); Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989) (no duty to protect from specific threats from halfway-house inmate); Little v. Division of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 53-54 (Utah 1983) (state had legal custody of autistic child); Benally v. Robinson, 14 Utah 2d 6, 376 P.2d 388 (1962) (officer had duty of due care to drunk person taken into custody); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965).
The first exception applies in this case. Officer Colyar had a statutory duty to exercise reasonable care in using his patrol car to pursue Floyd. The Motor Vehicle Code in effect at the time of the accident, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-14 (1988), imposed a duty on operators of emergency vehicles such as police cars to act with due regard for the safety of other persons on the road, as the Court of Appeals held. See Day, 882 P.2d at 1154. Section 41-6-14 exempted drivers of emergency vehicles from compliance with (1) speed limits, "if the operator does not endanger life or property," and (2) other traffic laws, if the operator provides audible and visual signals when in pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law. How
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