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Day v. State5/11/1999
events which they know or should have known would lead to . . . [the plaintiff's] injury by the [party being pursued] or by the police effort to stop the vehicle." Boyer v. State, 594 A.2d 121, 134 (Md. 1991) (quoting Keesling v. State, 420 A.2d 261, 267 (Md. 1980)). The court grounded its decision on both statutory and common law. See id. (citing Maryland Code § 21-106(d); Martin v. Rossignol, 174 A.2d 149 (Md. 1961); Sudbrook v. State, 138 A. 12 (Md. 1927)).
The State argues that a pursuing officer owes no duty of care to protect other persons on the highway from a negligent or reckless fleeing suspect. Specifically, the State asserts that because Officer Colyar could not directly control Floyd's actions, Floyd alone was responsible for Mrs. Day's injuries and her husband's death. However, the cases discussed above and Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-14(3)(a) support the proposition that Officer Colyar had a duty of care to other users of the highways and streets. Those cases also support the proposition that his conduct could be found to be a proximate cause of the Days' injuries if they were reasonably foreseeable. This Court has held that one may be liable for the reckless or negligent acts of another if they are reasonably foreseeable. See Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah 1996); cf. United States v. First Sec. Bank, 208 F.2d 424, 429-30 (10th Cir. 1953) (construing Utah law); see also Stark v. City of Los Angeles, 214 Cal. Rptr. 216 (Ct. App. 1985) (police have duty to drive so as not to impose unreasonable risk of harm on others, even when pursued person collides with third party); Tetro v. Town of Stratford, 458 A.2d 5 (Conn. 1983) (negligence of pursued does not foreclose liability of officers); 8 Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 456 (1997); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 303 (1965). This duty is based on a reasonable person's obligation to refrain from actions that may foreseeably result in injury. See 2 Fowler V. Harper & Fleming James, Jr., The Law of Torts § 16.12, at 940 (1956).
According to the State, Officer Colyar owed only a generalized duty to the public at large to enforce the law; therefore, the State cannot be held liable for Floyd's conduct. The State relies on the following cases: Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1991); Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989); see also Obray v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160 (Utah 1971) (sheriff held not liable for failing to investigate burglary); Cannon v. University of Utah, 866 P.2d 586 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Lamarr v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 828 P.2d 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
These cases are clearly distinguishable. First, none of them dealt with facts similar to those in the instant case. Second, in none of the cases was there a statute that imposed a duty of care on the government employee with respect to others in the particular circumstances. Third, the defendants in those cases were not, as here, acting in a continuous manner that created a direct, obvious, and imminent hazard to third persons that could have been obviated by the officer's ceasing the conduct creating the risk. Clearly, those cases in which injuries are caused by persons who have been chased or have escaped from custody, such as in Rollins and Ferree, stand for different principles than those applicable to this case.
The nature of Officer Colyar's pursuit of Floyd created an immediate, obvious, and significant threat of serious harm to other users of the highway that would no doubt have ended had he terminated his pursuit. Although law enforcement officers have a general duty to apprehend those who break the law, that duty is not absolute, especially where the violation i
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