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Landry v. Luscher5/25/1999
Filing two separate lawsuits based on the same event -claim splitting - is precluded in Washington. Sprague v. Adams, 139 Wash. 510, 515, 247 P. 960, 47 A.L.R. 529 (1926). But this defense may be waived. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 4 Wn. App. 49, 51-52, 480 P.2d 226 (1971). Kenneth and Katherine Landry obtained a Judgement against Kristen and Marjorie Luscher in small claims court for damage to their automobile, following an accident. The Landrys later sued in superior court for personal injuries arising out of the same accident. The superior court dismissed the second suit.
The questions here are whether the second personal injury suit is prohibited claim splitting. And whether the Luschers waived the defense because they knew or should have known that the Landrys would make two separate claims. We conclude that the Landrys' personal injury claim is barred by Washington's prohibition against claim splitting and the Luschers did not waive the defense.
FACTS
Automobiles driven by Katherine Landry and Kristen Luscher collided. Ms. Landry was injured and her car was damaged. The accident was apparently Ms. Luscher's fault.
The Landrys and Ms. Luscher's insurance company could not settle the property damage claim for the Landrys' car. Ms. Landry's husband, Kenneth Landry, filed a small claims action against Kristen and Marjorie Luscher for the property damage in district court. Mr. Landry signed the small claims notice. But he listed both he and Ms. Landry as plaintiffs on the notice of small claims.
The court awarded the Landrys $1,941.77 in the small claims action. The district court Judge identified both Mr. and Ms. Landry as "Plaintiffs" in the findings of fact and Conclusions of law.
Shortly after the accident, Ms. Landry began a course of treatment for cervical strain. She was treated surgically on November 26, 1996.
On May 8, 1997, the Landrys sued in superior court for Ms. Landry's injuries. The Luschers moved for dismissal based on Washington's prohibition against claim splitting. The Landrys argued that the personal injury suit was not the same claim because Ms. Landry was not a party in the prior small claims action. They also argued the Luschers waived the defense of claim splitting. The court concluded that Ms. Landry was a party to the small claims action. Relying on Sprague, the court concluded that the Landrys had split their claims and dismissed the personal injury suit.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review: We are presented with two legal questions. So review is de novo. Mountain Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Tydings, 125 Wn.2d 337, 341, 883 P.2d 1383 (1994).
B. Claim Splitting: A claimant may not split a single cause of action or claim. Such a practice would lead to duplicitous suits and force a defendant to incur the cost and effort of defending multiple suits. Sprague, 139 Wash. at 515; Hardware Dealers, 4 Wn. App. at 50-51. An injured party is limited to one lawsuit for property and/or personal injury damage resulting from a single tort alleged against the wrongdoer. Sprague, 139 Wash. at 519-20. This is in accord with the general rule that if an action is brought for part of a claim, a Judgement obtained in the action precludes the plaintiff from bringing a second action for the residue of the claim. Pretz v. Lamont, 6 Kan. App. 2d 31, 34-35, 626 P.2d 806, 24 A.L.R.4th 638 (1981) (quoting 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgements sec. 405, at 573-74) (concluding that the prohibition against claim splitting fulfills the four necessary conditions of res judicata); Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Simultaneous Injury to Person and Property As
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