 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Speer v. Donfeld6/19/1998
SPECIAL ACTION PROCEEDING
RELIEF GRANTED
Petitioners challenge the respondent Judge's order revoking petitioner James A. Coulter's admission pro hac vice as counsel for petitioner Theresa Speer in her underlying medical malpractice action. Petitioners appealed the order, but we determined that this court lacked appellate jurisdiction under A.R.S. ยง 12-2101. Thus, we dismissed the appeal and, in our discretion, redesignated the case as a special action filed pursuant to Rule 4, Ariz. R. P. Spec. Action, 17B Because petitioners have no remedy by appeal and because Speer is substantially affected by the revocation of Coulter's admission, we accept jurisdiction of the special action and, for the reasons discussed below, grant relief.
Donna Jewett, an attorney admitted to practice in Arizona, filed Speer's medical malpractice action in December 1994 against the real parties in interest, Southwestern Surgery Associates, Ltd.; Cigna Healthplan of Tucson, Arizona, Inc.; Carondelet Health Care Corporation of Arizona; and three doctors and their spouses. Coulter, an attorney licensed in Wyoming and a nonpracticing neurosurgeon, later applied for admission pro hac vice pursuant to Rule 33(d), Ariz. R. S. Ct., 17A A.R.S. His application was granted in August 1995, and the case was transferred the same day to Judge Rodriguez, who had already been assigned a related products liability action filed by Speer. Cigna filed its revocation motion on April 17, 1997. Less than three weeks later, the medical malpractice action was reassigned to the respondent Judge, who granted the motion in August 1997, revoking Coulter's admission based on ten instances of misconduct.
Supreme Court Rule 33(d) generally requires that counsel seeking admission pro hac vice in Arizona be a member in good standing of another state's bar and that Arizona counsel be designated to facilitate communication about the matter and to receive service of process. The rule also provides that admitted counsel "consents to the jurisdiction of the court to which application is made for any alleged misconduct which occurs during the course of the matter." Ariz. R. S. Ct. 33(d). The rule, however, does not define "misconduct" and is silent as to the grounds for revoking admission. And, as the respondent Judge noted in his minute entry, no Arizona cases had at that time addressed revocation of admission. Moreover, the real parties in interest do not contend that Coulter's conduct amounted to "professional misconduct" under Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct. We must thus look elsewhere for a definition of misconduct by which to measure Coulter's conduct and the respondent Judge's revocation order.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1443 (1971) defines misconduct as an "intentional wrongdoing" or "deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior." Several Arizona cases address intentional or deliberate misconduct by an attorney, although not in the context of Rule 33(d).
In the early case of Keys v. State, 55 Ariz. 24, 97 P.2d 736 (1940), the supreme court reversed the defendant's conviction because the deputy county attorney who tried the case had deliberately violated the trial court's order that witnesses were not to discuss the case with anyone except the attorney who had called them as witnesses. The violation occurred when the deputy county attorney allowed an all-night jail visit by a state's witness with a co-defendant who had previously pleaded guilty. The visit occurred the evening after the witness had testified. The supreme court found the attorney's conduct was "reprehensible under any circumstances." Id. at 28, 97 P.2d at 737.
Two years
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Arizona Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|