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Ramirez v. Health Partners of Southern Arizona6/23/1998 ation is rational, and such presumption can be overcome only by 'a clear showing of arbitrariness or irrationality.'" Lerma, 186 Ariz. at 233, 921 P.2d at 33, quoting Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry Co., 173 Ariz. 342, 350, 842 P.2d 1355, 1362 (App. 1992). Moreover, "we may consider either the legislature's actual purpose or any hypothetical basis upon which it could have acted." Lerma, 186 Ariz. at 233, 921 P.2d at 33.
In view of the significant policy considerations discussed above, we have no doubt that the Act passes muster under the rational basis test. The Act, including its immunity provisions, serves the legitimate state interest of providing people with a timely opportunity to donate organs. Granting qualified protection to hospital personnel who attempt in good faith to procure donated organs furthers that interest. We agree with the Wisconsin court that "the limitation on liability contained in [the Act] is justified by the legitimate public purpose of encouraging [health care providers] to participate in the removal of organs following death, and therefore increasing their supply." Williams, 223 N.W.2d at 848-49 (upholding Act's good faith immunity provision against equal protection challenge).
Arizona's legislature could reasonably conclude that qualified immunity for people who strive in good faith to carry out the requirements of the donation protocols is sound public policy. Donations must be obtained and processed quickly after death while tissue is still viable, in the midst of highly emotional and stressful situations. The legislature also could rationally conclude that the organ donation system will not function well unless donation personnel are assured they will not be sued for good faith mistakes in the process.
In Scappatura v. Baptist Hospital, 120 Ariz. 204, 584 P.2d 1195 (App. 1978), this court recognized the policy supporting qualified immunity in the context of doctors participating in peer review. At issue was A.R.S. § 36-445.02, a provision similar to § 36-849, that granted immunity to hospital personnel for their good faith acts in the hospital peer review process. Although the constitutionality of the statute was not at issue in that case, this court noted that § 36-445.02 furthered an important public policy by encouraging hospital peer review for the benefit of hospital patients and employees. We reach a similar Conclusion here with respect to organ donation.
CONCLUSION
We hold that there is no common law right of action to recover damages for no more than negligent interference with a dead body in the organ donation context. Accordingly, the Act's immunity provisions do not offend article 18, § 6. In view of the legitimate and compelling state interests under the statute, we also conclude that the Act does not violate equal protection principles. Finally, the alleged acts and omissions of HPSA fall within the Act's scope. In the absence of any showing of bad faith on HPSA's part, the trial court properly granted it summary judgment. We therefore affirm.
JOHN PELANDER, Presiding Judge
CONCURRING: PHILIP G. ESPINOSA, Judge JOSEPH W. HOWARD, Judge
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