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WHORTON v. BOATWRIGHT6/23/1998
In this medical malpractice action, the trial court granted a motion in limine excluding evidence regarding the physician's consumption of alcohol. The trial court excluded two categories of evidence. First, the court excluded the testimony of plaintiff/appellant Robert Whorton that, in his opinion, the physician was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the alleged malpractice. The court also excluded any evidence of alcohol use by the physician two days later or the excessive or improper use of alcohol by the physician on other occasions over ten years before and two years after the alleged malpractice. Under the particular circumstances of this case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence, and we affirm.
These rulings involve the application of long-standing principles of Georgia law. It is generally accepted that a lay witness may give opinion testimony after stating an adequate factual basis for the opinion. "This court has repeatedly held that a person's state of mind or mental condition is properly the subject of opinion testimony and that after narrating the facts and circumstances upon which his conclusion is based, a nonexpert witness may express his opinion as to the state of mind or mental condition of another." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Briard v. State, 188 Ga. App. 490, 492 (2) (373 S.E.2d 239) (1988). Proper subjects of such lay opinion testimony include intoxication, Sweetenburg v. State, 197 Ga. App. 36, 37 (3) (397 S.E.2d 451) (1990), as well as sanity, Briard, supra.
But this admissibility is not absolute. For example, the trial court may determine as a matter of law that the underlying facts can be clearly described for the jury and, therefore, that allowing the jury to hear an opinion it could reach for itself would invade the jury's exclusive province. Johnson v. Knebel, 267 Ga. 853, 857 (485 S.E.2d 451) (1997). Also, while ordinarily the sufficiency of the underlying facts to support the witness's opinion is a jury question, when the reasons stated by the witness are "plainly and indisputably" insufficient,
the court may so hold as a matter of law. Espy v. Preston, 199 Ga. 608, 609 (3) (34 S.E.2d 705) (1945) (denial of new trial error because reasons stated by lay witnesses insufficient to support opinions regarding insanity and testamentary capacity).
We also note that prior or subsequent incidents of negligence or misconduct are not generally admissible to show that a party was negligent on the occasion at issue. "With some rare exceptions each negligence case must be decided with reference to the particular transaction and no other, and to give the jury facts regarding previous or subsequent similar occurrences from which they may infer that the plaintiff or the defendant has been negligent or free from negligence in the same manner on other occasions is both irrelevant and prejudicial." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Carsten v. Wilkes Supermarket of Gwinnett County, 181 Ga. App. 834, 836 (2) (353 S.E.2d 922) (1987). Such evidence is considered "highly prejudicial to the issue of liability in the underlying negligence action." Webster v. Boyett, 269 Ga. 191 (496 S.E.2d 459) (1998) (trial court did not abuse discretion in excluding evidence of prior DUI offense from liability phase of negligence action involving DUI.) This rule also is subject to exceptions, such as those outlined in Leo v. Williams, 207 Ga. App. 321 (428 S.E.2d 108) (1993) (evidence of fixed and uniform habit), and similar decisions.
The trial court appears to have relied upon these principles in reaching its decision. The trial court noted that Mr. Whorton, in response to leading questions
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