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FISH v. SMITH6/15/1998
court understood and acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the applicable legal standards.
The trial court found that the requested discretionary costs were both necessary and reasonable but found that they were not exceptional. The trial court stated that it had "observed the conduct at trial and particularly the testimony of the expert witnesses" and was unpersuaded by the affidavits submitted by Fish "that this case was 'exceptional.' " The trial court also found that the discretionary costs Fish requested for expert witnesses were "not exceptional 'in a case of this nature.' " In addition, the trial court found that "travel and lodging expenses for expert witnesses and attorneys and photocopy expenses are not exceptional but, on the contrary, are common 'in a case of this nature.' " These findings satisfied both the dictates of I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) and the exercise of reason step in the abuse of discretion test outlined in Zimmerman.
Fish contends that the trial court abused its discretion because it failed to define "exceptional." In fact, by its reasoning in ruling that the requested costs were not exceptional, the trial court did give meaning to this word. The trial court pointed out that "expert
witnesses — medical; neuropsychological; accident reconstruction; vocational; and so forth — routinely testify in serious personal injury actions," and that " he vast majority of litigated personal injury cases . . . routinely require an assessment of the accident and the alleged injuries by various sorts of doctors of medicine, accident reconstructionists, vocational experts and so on." The trial court concluded: "This is the very 'nature' of these sorts of cases. Similarly, travel and lodging expenses for expert witnesses and attorneys and photocopy expenses are not exceptional but, on the contrary, are common 'in a case of this nature.' " This demonstrates the trial court's understanding of the meaning of "exceptional" as contained in I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D).
Fish also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to make a specific finding on each discretionary cost item. In Roe v. Harris, 128 Idaho 569, 917 P.2d 403 (1996), the Court ruled that the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and correctly followed the legal standard for evaluating discretionary costs because "although it did not evaluate the costs item by item, it did make express findings as required by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) with regard to the general character of the requested costs." Id. at 574, 917 P.2d at 408. We conclude the same is true here.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the discretionary costs requested by Fish.
III.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's denial of discretionary costs.
We award the defendants costs, but not attorney fees, on appeal.
TROUT, C.J., and SILAK, SCHROEDER, and WALTERS, JJ., concur.
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