 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Moran v. State6/3/1998
for the minor, Andrew Joseph Oubre, to be placed under the custody and control of anyone. Futhermore , upon information and belief, it is alleged that the State and/or Carol Sorich did not have defendant A.J. Oubre emancipated and therefore said defendants are still legally responsible for the minor defendant, A.J. Oubre's actions.
The defendants, State and Carol Sorich, through the above mentioned release of custody, turned the minor defendant, Andrew Joseph Oubre, loose to reap whatever havick he desired on innocent citizens of this State.
t is alleged that the defendants, State and Carol Sorich, knew or should have known that the minor defendant, Andrew Joseph Oubre, suffered from such serious behavioral problems, that his release would surely result in his (Andrew Joseph Oubre) actions harming naive persons, such as your plaintiffs.
Following a two-day trial, at which time only the issue of liability was addressed, the trial Judge ruled in favor of the plaintiffs finding that "the sole and proximate cause of the accident of August 18, 1989, was the careless operation of the Bertrand vehicle by A.J. Oubre." Concluding that A.J.'s use of the vehicle was permissive, he found that "LIGA . . . responsible for plaintiffs' damages, if any, up to the limits of the policy issued by Liberty Lloyds Insurance Company." Furthermore, the trial Judge found that the State had negligently pursued the court-ordered release of A.J. from their care and custody and, accordingly, imposed liability pursuant to this finding of negligence.
The State appeals, assigning the following as error:
A. The trial court erred by finding that there is little or no jurisprudence available which addresses the State's liability or lack of liability.
B. The trial court erred by inferring that OCS owed a duty to the plaintiffs.
C. The trial court erred by inferring that the plaintiffs' risk of harm was within the scope of protection afforded to the plaintiffs.
D. The trial court erred by inferring that the act of securing A.J.'s release (from OCS custody) a cause-in-fact (substantial contributing factor) in precipitating the plaintiffs' injuries.
E. The trial court erred by concluding that discretionary immunity is inapplicable in this case.
F. The trial court erred in admitting A.J.'s juvenile records into evidence.
Discussion
Confidentiality of the State's Records
We first address the State's assertion that the trial court erred in finding that A.J.'s juvenile records were admissible. They assert, as they did at trial, that La.R.S. 46:56 requires that juvenile records remain confidential and that their use is precluded for a purpose not connected with the administration of the Department of Social Services.
In concluding that the juvenile records relating to A.J. should remain under the court's seal, but were otherwise admissible, the trial court stated the following in overruling the State's objection:
In this connection, the Court is going to overrule the objection of the State and is going to allow plaintiff's counsel free access to the documents and to the utilization of same in the trial of this matter. I don't know that I can necessarily, for the record, state all of my reasons at this time for that, but at least so the record will reflect what my thinking is, I do wish to make what I'm going to call a semi-ruling on this at this time. It's obvious to me that the reasons for the statute is of a protective nature, that the idea is to protect the juvenile from perhaps his misdeeds of the past, so as to enable the juvenile to become a p
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 Louisiana Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|