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Moran v. State6/3/1998
ge of La. R.S. 46:56(H)(1) and in the absence of any jurisprudence to the contrary, we are unable to find that the trial court was clearly wrong or abused its discretion in allowing plaintiffs' use of the juvenile records in question. Furthermore, the records available for the plaintiffs' use were sealed by the court and any questioning pertaining to these records was done in a closed courtroom. Considering these protective measures, we find no clear error.
Negligence
The State maintains that no duty was owed to the plaintiffs in this matter. Rather, the State argues that the only duty that could have existed toward the plaintiffs was one of reasonable supervision and that this duty could only have existed if A.J. had been in the State's custody. Of course, the State points out that the March 16, 1989 court-ordered release terminated the State's custody and control of A.J. Furthermore, the State argues that even if A.J. had not been released from custody by the court, he would have been on runaway status and any duty toward the plaintiffs would not have extended to the type of situation presented in the instant matter. As stated in brief by the plaintiffs: "The scope of [the State's] duty . . . toward the plaintiffs did not encompass the risk that A.J. would obtain an automobile, drive the car, pick up the plaintiffs with the plaintiffs' consent, drive recklessly, lose control of the car, and injure the plaintiffs."
In considering a negligence theory of recovery under La. Civ. Code art. 2315, the Louisiana Supreme Court has previously stated that the relevant inquiries are:
(1) Was the conduct of which the plaintiff complains a cause-in-fact of the resulting harm?
(2) What, if any, duties were owed by the respective parties?
(3) Whether the requisite duties were breached?
(4) Was the risk, and harm caused, within the scope of protection afforded by the duty breached?
(5) Were actual damages sustained?
Pitre v. Louisiana Tech Univ., 95-1466, 95-1487, p. 8 (La. 5/10/96); 673 So.2d 585, 589-90 (quoting Socorro v. City of New Orleans, 579 West Page 528 So.2d 931 (La. 1991)) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 509, 136 L.Ed.2d 399 (1996). See also Hebert v. Southwest Louisiana Elec. Mem. Corp., 95-405 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/27/95); 667 So.2d 1148, (citing Theriot v. Lasseigne, 93-2661 (La. 7/5/94); 640 So.2d 1305), writs denied, 96-0277 (La. 5/17/96); 673 So.2d 607, 96-0798 (La. 5/17/96); 673 So.2d 608.
Each of the above-listed factors must be proven by the plaintiff, and failure to prove any single element defeats his or her ability to recover. Pitre, 95-1466, 95-1487; 673 So.2d 585. Furthermore, the determination of whether a duty exists is a question of law and the subsequent determination of whether a breach of that duty exists or does not exist is a factual question. Mundy v. Dep't. of Health and Human Resources, 620 So.2d 811 (La. 1993); Faucheaux v. Terrebonne Consol. Gov't, 615 So.2d 289 (La. 1993).
In concluding that the State was liable for their negligence, the trial court wrote as follows in its reasons for ruling:
There is little or no jurisprudence available to the Court in addressing the issue relating to the state liability or lack of liability in this case. The Court has carefully reviewed the state's argument on their issue as well as the provisions of La.C.C. 2317 & 2318 & LSA-R.S. 9:2798.1 and the several cases relied upon and the court rejects same. The Court is satisfied that the state sought its release of custody of A.J. from Judge Feucht, while he was on runaway status, solely and only because it was in the "State's best int
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